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SCANNED PDF

Searching for – and finding – necessary for—and finding—necessary truths, or, in other words, metaphysics, is not the same as "escaping from time and history." A truth is necessary only if it characterizes time and history as such, otherwise not.

Moreover, our human knowledge of the necessary is not itself necessary in the same sense. If we arrive at a correct understanding of the necessary, this is a contingent achievement, conditioned by historical factors, even as the same is true if our understanding is mistaken. Mistakes can be made even in arithmetic, how much more so in metaphysics. Knowledge of necessary truths is not infallible except in the divine case, which is infallible with respect to contingent as well as necessary truths. Human knowledge, by radical contrast, is fallible with respect to knowledge of both types of truths. There is a very important difference between the logical necessity of the proposition and the epistemological certainty of our knowledge of it.

Also, by their very logic, contingent truths cannot be deduced from necessary truths alone; therefore, necessary truths cannot be "foundational" for contingent truths in that sense.

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(3) There are necessary truths, and we can – to can—to some extent, or with whatever qualifications as to precision and certainty – sensibly certainty—sensibly search for them.

Against (1), one can urge the principle of contrast, arguing that "contingent truths" loses its meaning if "necessary truths" has no application.

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