By Schubert Ogden
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1.When Quenstedt argues that the same effect is produced not by God alone, nor by the creature alone, nor partly by God and partly by the creature, but at the same time by God and the creature, as one and the same total efficiency, viz., by God as the universal and first cause, and by the creature as the particular and second cause" (as quoted by Wood, The Question of Providence: 85) -- when he argues so, is he perhaps arguing somewhat as I argue against monergism/Pelagianism, on the one hand, and synergism, on the other? In any case, his use of the distinction between "God as the universal and first cause" and "the creature as the particular and second cause," seems to converge very closely with my use of a similar, ifnot, indeed, the same, distinction in defining God as "the universal and all-inclusive individual," on the one hand, and the creature as "the particular and partially exclusive individual," on the other.
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