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My question is whether, and, if so, how, anything like this line of reasoning can be pursued in terms of an austerely transcendental -- as transcendental—as distinct from Hartshorne's categorial -- metaphysicscategorial—metaphysics.

One thought that may encourage an affirmative answer is that it is precisely God's "perceptive grasp," or "actual concrete awareness of things" (as distinct from "the virtual or abstract awareness of them") that figures in Hartshorne's reasoning as he does. Assuming, then, that the real, literal principle of the actual or concrete is not "perception," or "feeling," or "experience," or "sentience" but precisely "relativity" (cf. 150), one could reason, not that "virtue is knowledge," but rather that "virtue is relatedness," and that adequate relatedness to context is by definition right action. Because adequate relatedness is relatedness not only to all, but also to "all-in-all," the self-relating, all-integrating decision whereby it again and again becomes actual can only influence any and all subsequent such decisions in a comparably adequate way. In this sense, adequate internal relatedness in action, as influential on any and all subsequent actions, is by definition right action.