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4. That, in point of fact, Hartshorne's dogmatic answer to this question merely begs it at once becomes clear when one realizes that all that he could possibly mean -- clearly and coherently -- by mean—clearly and coherently—by "experience as such or in general" is the transcendental idea of "event," i.e., something that (1) is not only real for other things but also such that other things are real for it, but that (2) cannot be real for itself and, therefore, has strict rather than genetic identity. That any "actual occasion" of human experience is a specific instantiation of this transcendental idea of event may indeed warrant claiming that in any other such instantiation there must be something that corresponds to such an occasion and may, therefore, be thought and spoken of "symbolically," though not literally, as an occasion of "experience." But more than this metaphysics as such is not in a position to claim without begging a question that it must, in the nature of the case, leave open if it is to be a properly critical, nondogmatic metaphysics.

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