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According to De George, "in order to grant anyone epistemic authority y must know something about the field and enough to know that x knows more than y does." Thus it would be reasonable to acknowledge an authority in morality, say, only when "[t]he moral agent . . . understand[s] what it means to be moral and to think in moral terms. If [she or] he does not, [she or] he may simply do as [she or] he is told or advised from habit or fear or inclination or laziness. But if [she or] he does know what it means to be moral and if [she or] he wishes to be moral, [she or] he may well seek moral guidance, and, I would argue, properly so. In full knowledge of the diversity of moral opinion and the dubiousness of finding the complete truth, [she or] he may judge on the basis of [her or] his own experience who it is who can guide [her or] him in moral matters, either because that person seems to know more or seems to act better than [she or] he [her- or] himself. [She or ] he may seek the knowledge, clear thinking, and the approach to problems in the light of principle which is supplied by the scholar; or [she or] he may seek the insight of someone who appears to [her or] him to be holy or at least morally commendable; or [she or ] he may emulate the example of some saint or moral hero.

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