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But "doing our' part in the system of things," like "striving," sounds rather more like loyalty than trust, even if it is "with confidence" that we loyally do our part, or strive---such strive—such confidence, or trust, presumably coming first.

So "[w]hat Santayana calls 'animal faith' is the confidence of every sentient creature in its environment as favorable to its efforts to live and to continue its species," while "[f]aith on the human level is trust that the nature of things insures the appropriateness of ideals of generosity, honesty, and esthetic refinement, or goodness, truth, and beauty, to such an extent that despite aU all frustrations and vexations, despite disloyalty or crassness in our fellows, despite death itself, it is really and truly better to live, and to live in accord with these ideals, than to give up the struggle in death or in cynicism. Of this human faith [Hartshorne adds] there are varieties almost beyond telling: the great religious faiths, and the various attempted philosophical substitutes for these" (163; he also speaks of "human faith," or "faith on the human level," as "trust in the environment as an adequate basis for our efforts to live in accordance with certain ideals" [164]; cf. also "the mere general faith that somehow it is all right for us to live and try to to do our best" [165]).

But, surely, if Hartshorne's right that any concrete whatever, even a physical particle, is and must be at least "sentient," one may well question whether Santayana ever says or implies any thing to indicate that he means by "animal faith" what Hartshorne says he means by it. Moreover, would Hartshorne himself really want to use "animal faith" in such all an utterly general sense? Or has he tacitly slipped back into using "sentient" in its ordinary sense to mean simply "animal," or "animate"?-—Note his terminology: "the great religious faiths" and "the various attempted philosophical substitutes for these," i.e., philosophical faiths (163); "diverse faiths"; "particular form[s] of faith"; "the various faiths"; "faith, or life-trust" (165f165 f; 171.).---.

about something other than God. One may answer them by thinking and speaking, say, about Nature or the Absolute, one's Real Self or the Whole, Nirvana or the Form of the Good. Cf. On Theology: 122.

As for his talk about the "ideal" of a certain form of behavior, I wonder whether it's more than verbally different from talking, as I'm accustomed to do, about a normative understanding of a certain form of behavior. I don't see why one couldn't say equally appropriately, for instance, that the ideal of doing theology is to appropriate witness critically by critically interpreting its meaning and critically validating its claims to 'validity and that doing just this is what it is to do theology, normatively understood.

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"Reason . . . cannot exist without faith. The finite is nothing except as part of a whole. We cannot evade this by calling it a part of a part of a part of a part . . . and so on without ever speaking the word 'whole'; for the longer we go on refusing to speak it, the more insistently it rings in our ears and forces its 4 repressed meaning upon our minds. Unless there is a whole, a universe, an infinite, there is no science; for there is no certainty beyond the certainty of mere observation and of bare particular fact; whereas science is universal or nothing, and is bankrupt unless it can discover general laws. But this discovery, as every student of logic knows, rests on presuppositions concerning the nature of the universe as a whole---Iaws whole—Iaws of thought that are at the same time laws of the real world, not scientifically discovered but embraced by an act of faith, of necessary and rational faith" (144).

"Whatever may be said about the details of the world, there is always something that may be said about the world as a whole, namely, that it is a whole: a whole within which all distinctions fall, outside which there is nothing, and which, taken as a whole, is the cause of itself and of everything in it. The details of the world are the proper theme of scientific thought; but its characteristics as a whole, its unity and the implications of that unity, are not matters for scientific inquiry. They are, rather, a foundation on which all scientific inquiry rests. If it was possible to deny them--which them—which it is not--scientific not—scientific inquiry would instantly cease" (138).

'"The peculiarity of the cogito ergo sum is that Descartes here found a point at which reason and faith coincide. The certainty of my own existence is a matter of faith in the sense that it does not rest on argument but on direct intuition; but it is a matter of reason in the sense that it is universal and necessary and cannot be denied by any thinking being. It resembles the religious man's knowledge of God in its immediate certainty; but not every man is always religious, and faith in God may desert us. It resembles the knowledge of the Aristotelian first principles in being universal and necessary; but the Aristotelian first principles are deniable and thus lack the absolute and immediate conviction that is inseparable from the cogito" (137).

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"Kant was trying to treat God, freedom, and immortality as certainties of the same kind as Descartes' cogito ergo sum: that is, as universal, necessary, and so far rational, but indemonstrable and so far matters of faith" (137).

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