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(1) As I have long since acknowledged, there is the difference between the existential and the (fully) reflective levels of understanding, by which I mean something like Habermas's distinction between the levels of (Lebens-), Praxis, and Diskurs. One reason, then, for thinking "theory" systematically ambiguous, or one way in which it might be so thought of, is that it could be taken as a synonym for "understanding," in which case one could distinguish "theory" at the existential level from "theory" at the (fully) reflective level.

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(3) Perhaps a more appropriate use of language, however, would be to use "theory" (systematically ambiguously!) only in the first of these two ways---so ways—so as to distinguish, namely, between the cognitive aspect or dimension of self-understanding and praxis, on the one hand, and critical reflection so as to validate the validity of claims expressed or implied by self-understanding and praxis, on the other. In the case of the other way, then, one could depend on the distinction between "abstract" and "concrete," rather than on that between "theory" and "praxis." Relative to understanding the meaning of things for us, understanding the structure of things in themselves is not so much more theoretical as simply more abstract.

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