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If there are substantive rights that are not properly matters of statutory legislation-estatutory legislation—e.g., "the pursuit of happiness," "security," "justice"-because... —because

If any formative provision can be morally authorized, finally, only by "implying some ultimate substantive terms by appeal to which it can be validated" (1012), why should it be included in the specific provisions of a constitution, while all substantive provisions.

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It may mean either of two things: either that x presupposes y, in the sense that x requires x requires y by a specific and definite necessity; or that x anticipates y, in the sense that x requires x requires y by only a generic and indefinite necessity. (Perhaps another way of explaining what is meant by the two things that implication may mean-imean—i.e., presupposition and anticipation-is and anticipation—is to say that, whereas the implication rightly distinguished as "presupposition" is unconditional, the implication rightly distinguished as "anticipation" is conditional. 

What Gamwell seems to want to say about a proper democratic constitution, which as such is merely formative, is two things: both that it necessarily implies certain substantive religious, moral, and political first principles, in the sense that it necessarily presupposes such first principles; and that it necessarily implies certain further, more specific, substantive principles (procedures, policies, and practices and so on), in the sense that it necessarily anticipates such further principles. 

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