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Value  judgments  employing gerundive predicates  presuppose (1)  norms; and (2)  judgments of fact to the effect that subjects to which 
gerundive  predicates  are  applied have the characteristics  that the relevant norms specify  as  requisite  to  their valid  application.  So  the  value judgment, 
"x is good (worthy of approval or a  pro-attitude)" may be validly inferred from these two premises:  (1)  good x's  are those that have the  characteristics a, 
h,  and c;  and (2)  x  in fact has the characteristics, a,  b,  and c. Value judgments employing gerundive predicates presuppose (1) norms; and (2) judgments of fact to the effect that subjects to which gerundive predicates are applied have the characteristics that the relevant norms specify as requisite to their valid application. So the value judgment, "x is good (worthy of approval or a  propro-attitude)" may be validly inferred from these two premises:   (1) good x's are those that have the characteristics a, h b, and c;  and and (2) x in fact has the characteristics, a,  b b,  and and c.

Assuming  this  analysis this analysis as essentially correct, one can understand objective relativism .. as a value theory to affirm norms of the form,  good good x's are those that have factual  characteristics a,  b b, and c because these characteristics are good for  things things having factual characteristics d,  c e,  and and f. (This simply applies H. Richard Niebuhr's principle  thatthat, if one being is good for another, it is because of its structure and the way in which its structure corresponds to the structure of the other being, so as to meet the other being's needs, fit its capacity, complement its potentialities, and so on.)  Thus "x is good for things having factual characteristics d,  e e,  and it and f may be validly inferred from  this  norm..this norm taken as  the  major the major premise, together with the judgment of fact,   "x has the characteristics a,  b b,  and and c,"  as as the minor premise.  

As  for  objective for objective relativism's  conceptconcept,   "center  of of value,"  it is  equivalent functionally  to  it is equivalent functionally to "(primary)  determinant  of determinant of meaning"   (V.  BrummerBrümmer).  In  the example In the example cited, things having factual  characteristics characteristics d,  ee,  and! and f are   "centers of value,"  or  or "(prirnaryprimary)  determinants  of determinants of meaning," for things having factual characteristics a, b,  and and c.

4 April 2007