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Evangelical critics of "liberalism" allege that  critics  of "liberalism"  allege  that its hallmark was-and 
is-Ita cognitive relativism."  By making experience  the  one  and only primal 
(noetic) source of theology, liberalism condemned theology to be like all other 
human efforts to know and to understand. It thereby became simply one 
more part of "the human quest for  understanding, ... which is one 
undertaken from  within the flux  of human experience  employing the  tools 
available  to human experimenters"  and never yielding  "any certainty beyond 
that of an interim report offered from within the fallabilities of the fragile, 
human psyche." In thus  becoming "relative  and fallible,"  like  all  other 
human knowledge, theology becomes  quite different from  "the kind of 
knowledge given by revelation"  (David Wells:  179,  174). 
Evangelical  critics  of "liberalism"  allege  that its hallmark was-and is-Ita a "cognitive relativism." By  By making experience the one and only primal primal (noetic) source of theology, liberalism condemned theology to be like all other human other human efforts to know and to understand. It thereby became simply one more one more part of "the human quest for understanding, ... which is one undertaken one undertaken from within the flux of  of human experience employing the tools available tools available to human experimenters" and  and never yielding "any certainty beyond that beyond that of an interim report offered from within the fallabilities of the fragile, human  human psyche." In thus becoming  becoming "relative and fallible," like all other human  like  all  other human knowledge, theology becomes quite different from "the kind of knowledge of knowledge given by revelation" (David Wells: 179 179, 174 174). It confuses  

But this charge of "cognitive relativism"  cannot be sustained. It confuses what may very well be only a critical critical, nondogmatic attitude toward claims toward claims to validity (and authority) with a relativistic  relativistic attitude according to which to which all such claims, being valid for each  each of the individuals or groups who make who make or imply them, must be accepted as equally valid. Conversely, those who those who make this charge typically seek to commend their own uncritical, dogmatic  dogmatic attitude toward (at least certain) claims to validity (and authority) by arguing by arguing that any other attitude  attitude either is or necessarily devolves into relativisminto relativism. Significantly, liberals or  or radicals who  who think of themselves as holding as holding an extreme contrary position to that of evangelicals, reason in essentially in essentially the same way-inferring, as Gordon Kaufman does, for example, that  that any claim to absolute truth has to be given up if one is to  to maintain a consistently a consistently critical, nondogmatic attittude toward nondogmatic attitude toward claims to validity (and authority). 2Enlightenment, as distinct from positions that may have been held by thinkers representing themselves, or represented by others, as belonging to the (normative) Enlightenment tradition. Enlightenment means, normatively, not anti-traditionalism, but,if one may say so, antiuncriticalism, anti-dogmatism-including such expressions of an uncritical, dogmatic attitude as may well characterize persons taking non-or even antitraditionalist positions. 20December 1991

But this charge of "cognitive relativism" cannot be sustained.

and authority). 

My  question is  whether the whole  anti-foundationalist polemic of many My question is whether the whole anti-foundationalist polemic of many contemporary philosophers doesn't involve something like the same confusionsame confusion. One is not, or need not be, a foundationalist  foundationalist simply because one insists one insists that our claims to validity (and authority) be critically validated somehow validated somehow by reason and experience. Or, alternatively, if such an insistence simply insistence simply as such makes one properly a foundationalist foundationalist, then being a foundationalist a foundationalist is nothing to be ashamed of, or apologized for. Nor  Nor can an uncriticalan uncritical, dogmatic anti-traditionalism be foisted off onto thethe Enlightenment,  as  distinct from positions that may have been held by thinkers representing themselves, or represented by others, as belonging to the (normative)  Enlightenment  tradition.  Enlightenment means, normatively, not anti-traditionalism, but, if one may say so,  anti­uncriticalism,  anti-dogmatism-including such expressions  of an uncritical, dogmatic attitude as may well characterize persons taking non- or even anti­traditionalist  positions. 

20 December 1991