Page History

SCANNED PDF

Value judglnents elnploying gerundive predicates presuppose  judglnents  elnploying gerundive predicates  presuppose 
(1)  norms; and (2)  judglnents of fact to the effect that subjects to which 
gerundive  predicates  are  applied have the characteristics  that the relevant 
norms specify  as  requisite  to  their valid  application.  So  the  value judpnent, 
"x is good (worthy of approval or a pro pro-attitude)" may be validly inferred inferred 
from these two pren..ises:  (1)  good x's  are those that have the  characteristics a, 
h,  and c;  and (2)  x  in fact has the characteristics, a,  b,  and c.
Value judgments employing gerundive predicates presuppose (1) norms; and (2) judgments of fact to the effect that subjects to which gerundive predicates are applied have the characteristics that the relevant norms specify as requisite to their valid application. So the value judgment, "x is good (worthy of approval or a  pro-attitude)" may be validly inferred from these two premises:  (1) good x's are those that have the characteristics a,h h, and c; and  and (2) x in fact has the characteristics, a, b b, and  and c. x's

Assuming  this  analysis as essentially correct, one can understand objective relativism.. as a value theory to affirm norms of the form,  good x's are are those that have factual characteristics characteristics a, b b, and c because these characteristics these characteristics are good for things  things having factual characteristics d, c c, and  and f. (This simply applies H. Richard Niebuhr's principle that that, if one being is good for good for another, it is because of its structure and the way in which its structure corresponds structure corresponds to the structure of the other being, so as to n..eet meet the other being's needss needs, fit its capacity, complement its poentialitiespotentialities, and so on.) Thus Thus "x is good is good for things having factual characteristics d, e, andf' Inay be validly inferred from this norn e,  and it may be validly inferred from  this  norm..taken as the major  the  major premise, together with the judgment the judgment of fact,  "x has the characteristics a, b b, and  and c,"  as the minor premise. 

As  for  objective relativism's  concept,  "center  of value"  it is  equivalent functionally  to  "(primary)  determinant  of meaning"  (V.  Brummer).  In  the example cited, things having factual  characteristics d,  e,  and! are  "centers of value,"  or  "(prirnary)  determinants  of as the Ininor prelnise. d, e, and! are "centers of value, " or "(prirnary) detenninants of meaning," for things having factual characteristics a, b, and c.

(1) norms; and (2) judglnents of fact to the effect that subjects to which gerundive predicates are applied have the characteristics that the relevant norms specify as requisite to their valid application. So the value judpnent,

AssLUning this analysis as essential!y correct, one can understand objective relativisn.. as a value theory to affinn norms of the form, good

As for objective relativism's concept, "center of value/' it is equivalent functionally to "(prilnary) determinant of meaning" (V. Bri.ilnmer). In the exalnple cited, things having factual characteristics and c.

4 April 2007