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1. Philosophy My inclination is to say that CISC's distinction between "critical" and &nbsp;"speculative" philosophy does not correspond exactly to my distinction &nbsp;between the "critical-analytic" and the "constructive-synthetic" aspect &nbsp;or function of philosophy. &nbsp;(My distinction seems somewhat closer to the &nbsp;distinction he makes when he says, "we need to construct \[si£Jsic\] general &nbsp;theories of meaning and truth applying to all types of discourse, includinginclud­ing moral discourse, scientific discourse, esthetic discourse,and religiousreli­gious discourse" even while "at the same time Wewe need to explore more &nbsp;thoroughly e~cheach of the particular domains of human experience and discoursedis­course" (MIR, 8). CIS&nbsp;C's distinction seems, rather, to be not unrelated to &nbsp;the distinction I have sometimes made between "transcendental" and "categorialcate­gorial" metaphysics. I.e., trans~epde~~~l  transcendental&nbsp;metaphysics undertakes to determinede­termine the purely formal logical type distinctio~s that any and all our &nbsp;uses of "reality" and related terms such as "truth," etc. necessarily &nbsp;presuppose. This it does by way of an attempt to construct "regional ontologieson­tologies" on the basis of a critical analysis of the constitutive concepts &nbsp;and assertions of the several different "domains of truth," as well as the &nbsp;"fundamental ontology" of human existence as such. &nbsp;Withal, the sole concerncon­cern of a transcendental metaphysics is to abstract from everything materialmater­ial--from any and all values of the various variables--to identify the &nbsp;strictly formal necessary condition(s) of the possibility of all our experienceexper­ience and thought, and hence the strictly first principles of reality as &nbsp;such. &nbsp;A cat~<2..Lial metapl:lysicscategorial metaphysics, by contrast, undertakes an in~e:..~r...e:..~~i.<2..1l. interpretation&nbsp;of these strictly formal princlplesprinciples in some mat:erlalLeLUI\!'jmaterial terms, Itt It::J..lll\~ u\[some in terms of some&nbsp;of the concepts or categories of our thought and experience in the 2severalseveral domains of truth. &nbsp;For various good reasons, the most adequate &nbsp;categorial metaphysics will be the metaphysics whose interpretive scheme &nbsp;is derived from the "fundamental ontology" provided by an existentialist &nbsp;analysis of our ow-.:1own existence. &nbsp;But even that kind of an existentialist, &nbsp;or psychicalist, categorial metaphysics is still the attempt somehow to &nbsp;fill in the purely formal scheme of transcendental metaphysics with some &nbsp;material contents, which can be done, obviously, only by means of analogyanal­ogy.&nbsp;