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                                                                                                                 What is "the bondage of the will"?

1. More exactly, what is "the bondage of the will," assuming an anthropology that, in Bultmann's sense, goes beyond subjectivism? Is it that human beings are not free to do either good or evil, but free only to do evil (non posse non peccare); or is it, rather, that, regardless of how they exercise the option of doing good or doing evil, they remain bound to themselves, since neither good nor evil deeds, any more than anything else, have any ultimate meaning or worth apart from God's all-embracing, all-consummating love – -- and, in this sense remain "unjustified"? Or is the bondage in question somehow both of these?

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4. But, then, is the only bondage of the will that Luther allows for that to which he refers when he says, "whatsoever is in our own will is evil; whatsoever is in our understanding is error. Wherefore in matters pertaining to God, man hath nothing but darkness, errors, malice, and perverseness both of will and understanding" (175 f.)? The answer, clearly, is No; for Luther says earlier in the same commentary: "Take thou the work of the law \[Gal 2:16\] . . . generally for that which is contrary to grace. Whatsoever is not grace, is the law, whether it be judicial, ceremonial, or the Ten Commandments. Wherefore if thou couldest do the work of the law according to this commandment: 'Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart,' &c. (not to say here that no man yet ever did or could do so), yet thou shouldest not be justified before God; for a man is not justified by the works of the law" (128). Thus, according to Luther's own understanding, the bondage of the will need not be conceived as exhausted by human beings' inveterate sinfulness (even if he himself so conceived it). For even if they were to do all that the law requires, they still would not be justified \-\- and, in _that_ important sense, would still be in bondage \-\- since "a man is not justified by the works of the law" but by "grace only and alone" (102). Luther does make clear, to be sure, that his own doctrine of the universality of sin is more than a merely _factual_, i.e., is a properly _modal_, doctrine: "no man yet ever did or _could_ do so" (italics added). But, aside from the fact that a doctrine of sin that is non-Augustinian, although also non-Pelagian, can also speak of "could," there are the best of reasons for avoiding an out-an-out modal doctrine of sin, anyhow.

5. What these reflections all come to, then, is this: (1) human beings are justified, if at all, only by God's love, and this would be true even if they were perfectly to fulfill the law. Therefore, the bondage of the will – -- in the sense of the radical limit on human freedom – is, in the first and most fundamental sense, their utter dependence upon God, not only for their being at all but also for the justification of their being – for their being's amounting to anything, making any difference, having any meaning. (2) Given the fact of sin, human beings are, as it were, dependent upon God a fortiori, since nothing can free them from their sin, and in that sense, justify them, except the same love of God – the marvel of which, and the truth of the gospel, is that it comprises even the fact of sin within its scope. Apart from that love, therefore, or, more exactly, apart from their obedient faith in it, they are and remain in bondage in the second sense, although even this bondage is not incompatible with their being free to make the categorial, or predicamental, choices of ordinary life. Whether as sinners or as believers, they can reproduce themselves, create culture, govern themselves, and manage their households.

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7. Sad to say, however, there are other passages in the same commentary, where Luther at least appears to take it all back! For example, he says: "True it is that we ought to fulfill the law, and to be justified through the fulfilling thereof: but sin hindereth us. . . . Faith therefore is our righteousness in this life. But in the life to come, when we shall be thoroughly cleansed and delivered from all sins and concupiscences, we shall have no more need of faith and hope, but we shall then love perfectly" (495; cf. also 382). Even if one could argue that there need not be a contradiction between saying (1) that a human being ought to be justified; and (2) that a human being ought not to be justified by fulfilling the law – since to fulfill the law in order to be justified, without already being justified through obedient faith, is precisely not to fulfill it, because "the law commandeth that we should fear, love and worship God with a true faith" (267; cf. also 247: "'to do' is first of all to believe, and so through faith to perform the law") – -- there remains the disconcerting delimitation of faith to this life only, although Luther still might agree that even Adam before the fall could have been justified solely by faith.

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