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Mourad observes, to my mind helpfully, that "\[t\]he term 'foW1dationalismfoundationalism' can be used in a narrow and a broad sense. In the narrow sense, 'foundationalislTIfoundationalism' refers to the ITlodernmodern classical view that subjects ought to accept only beliefs that are self-evident, about one's own immediate experience, or appropriately based on beliefs of these kinds. In the broad sense, ... the 'foundationalist ... starts from the distinction between beliefs we accept in the basic way and those we accept on the evidential basis of other beliefs.... His idea is that every belief is either basic or accepted on the basis of other beliefs... ; he adds that in a correct or healthy human system of beliefs, there _are_ _basic beliefs, and every nonbasic belief will be accepted on the basis of other beliefs that offer evidential support for it, in such a way that every belief is supported, finally, by basic beliefs, beliefs ill the foundations. These beliefs, of course, are not accepted on the basis of others; the basis relation is finite and terminates in the foundations.' _
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"A belief is 'properly basic' if it is warranted to some degree and not based on other beliefs. The difference between the classical foundationalist \[i.e., the foundationalist in the narrow sense\] and \[what Plantinga calls\] the generic foundationalist \[i.e., the foundationalist in the broad sense\] is that the former does and the latter does not specify which types of belief are properly basic" _(Transcendental Arguments and J1Istified Christian Beliefs_:_ _48 f; cf. Plantinga's interpretation of the "classical picture" of justification, which Mourad cites on 53: "A person 5_S_ is justified in accepting a belief_ _p_ _if and only if_ _either_ _(1)_ _p_ _is properly basic for 5_S_, that is\[,\] self-evident, incorrigible, or Lockeanly evident to the senses for 5_S_,_ _or_ _(2) 5_S_ believes_ _p_ _on the evidential basis of propositions that are properly bClsicbasic and that evidently support_ _p_ _deductively, inductively, or abductively"). _
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Clearly, if I'm a foundationalist, I'nl m no more a "classical fowldationalistfoundationalist" than Plantinga is, because I do notspecify not specify which types of belief are properly basic. Mourad recognizes this when he says, "Ogden does not explicitly propound a Cartesian or Lockean theory of justification. In fact, his general principle of credibility is explicitly neutral to competing theories of justification, since it suggests that substantive epistemic principles are always type-specific" (122).

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