By Schubert Ogden
On tlie Distinctions between Thought and Speech and Conceptuality and TerminologyTerminology
On The Distinctions between Thought and Speech and Conceptuality and Terminology
Although in some of my writings I have distinguished between between "conceptuality" and "symbolism" (or "concepts" and "symbols") in strict strict
correspondence with my distinction between "thought" and "speech" (or or "thinking" and "speaking"), I should have distinguished instead between between
"conceptuality" and "terminology" (or "concepts" and "terms"). Why? Well, because because, in addition to the precedent set by the traditional correlation between between "concepts" and "terms" in the language of logic, "symbolism" (or "symbols") in the in the modern theological context normally has the more restricted connotation of nonliteral of nonliteral discourse, or discourse used in its relatively secondary, as distinct from distinct from its relatively primary, sense. Thus, while all symbols are terms, not all terms all terms are symbols, because some terms are literal in meaning rather than symbolicthan symbolic, insofar as they are used in their relatively primary, as distinct from from
their relatively secondary, senses.If
If Summer 1982; rev. 18 August 2003 a term is wanted in place of "symbol," perhaps "image" will do as well as well as any. In that event, one could say that, while all images are concepts, not all all
concepts are images, because some concepts are correlative with terms used literally used literally rather than symbolically. This presupposes that one can appropriately distinguish appropriately distinguish between a broad and a strict sense of "concepts," "conceptuality," "thinking," "thought," etc. In their broad sense, such terms cover all the essential units essential units on the "logical," as distinct from the "grammatical," side of the correlation, where where "terms," "terminology," "speaking," "speech," etc. have the same comprehensive same comprehensive scope. In their narrow sense, on the other hand, "concepts," "conceptuality," and so on cover only some such essential units, "concepts" in this in this narrow sense being different from "images," "conceptuality" from from "imagery," "thinking" from "imagining," "thought" from "imagination," etc.
Summer 1982; rev. 18 August 2003