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There is clear!y clearly a problem with talking about "the meaning of x for us."

To say, for example, that christological predicates are by way of 
expressing the meaning of Jesus for us may be (mis)W1.derstood to mean that 
they express the meaning that Jesus has only for those asserting the 
predicates, or, worse still, that the christological assertion they somehow 
express or imply is true only in the sense of true for them. But as certain as it 
is  that faith, sensu  stricto, exists only where I  accept the meaning of Jesus for 
me, it is just as  certain that his meaning for me is not the only meaning I 
intend to express when I  confess, e.g.,  "Jesus is the Christ." In making this 
confession, I  also intend to assert or imply that Jesus is worthy of having the 
same meaning for  any human being whatsoever. 

To say, for example, that christological predicates are by way of 
To say, for example, that christological predicates are by way of expressing the meaning of Jesus for us may be (mis)understood to mean that they express the meaning that Jesus has only for those asserting the predicates, or, worse still, that the christological assertion they somehow express or imply is true only in the sense of true for them. But as certain as it is that faith, sensu stricto, exists only where I accept  accept the meaning of Jesus for mefor me, it is just as certain that his meaning for me is not the only meaning I intend I intend to express when I confess confess, e.g.,  "Jesus is the Christ." In making this confessionthis confession, I also  also intend to assert or imply that Jesus is worthy of having the same the same meaning for any  any human being whatsoever..  

Recognizing this is  evidently closely connected with the criticism I've long made of Marxsen's typical analysis of "second statements." That God is my my Creator is indeed what I confess  confess when I confess  confess the Creed authentically as a as a symbol of my own obedient faith and belief. But what I imply imply-and necessarilyand necessarily imply-by my confession is that God is the primal source and final end and final  end of everything and everyone and is therefore worthy of being acknowledged being acknowledged as such by anyone "capable of God," and so capable of making such making such an acknowledgement.

Of course, that x is worthy of being so acknowledged need not imply thatimply that y isn isn't-where x and yare  and y are different values of the variable, "the allencompassing all­encompassing whole from, through, and for which are all things and for which  and for which we exist, and which is therefore our primal source and final end end." Provided  Provided that x and  and y, altho1:lgh although verbally and even conceptually different, are not are not really so because they both necessarily imply the same self-understanding as understanding as authentic and the same metaphysics and morals as  as true-provided that this that this condition is satisfied, x and  and y may  may both be worthy of being acknowledged by acknowledged by anyone as the primal source and the final end  end of her or his own existence and existence and of all existence, even though her or his actual experience and reflection warrant reflection warrant so acknowledging one or the other but not both.

To say, for example, that christological predicates are by way of expressing the meaning of Jesus for us may be (mis)W1.derstood to mean that they express the meaning that Jesus has only for those asserting the predicates, or, worse still, that the christological assertion they somehow express or imply is true only in the sense of

Recognizing this is evidently closely connected with the criticism I've long made of Marxsen's typical analysis of "second statements." That God isOf course, that

22 February 2005