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2. By what is one placed in an eschatological relation so understood?

Wiki MarkupOne is placed in an eschatological relation so understood by ultimate reality itself in its meaning for us \ -\- whether implicitly presented or explicitly re-presented as well. Because ultimate reality is universal and ever-present, a self is always already, and therefore originally, placed in an eschatological relation at least implicitly, the meaning of ultimate reality for us being implicitly presented to any self simply as a self through, as Paul says, "the things \ [God\] has made" (Rom 1 :20). But because the meaning ofultimate reality for us can also be re-presented explicitly, a self can be specially, and even decisively, placed in an eschatological relation (not by, but) _through_ whatever, or whoever, re-presents this meaning, whether primally, primarily, or secondarily. In this case, the self is still placed in an eschatological relation only _by_ ultimate reality itself, even if also _through_ its re-presentation(s), whether merely special or also decisive.

N. B. : These answers to the questions assume: (1) that a self as such exists understandingly, understanding itself and ultimate reality generally and leading its life accordingly, freely and responsibly; (2) that the meaning of ultimate reality for us is determined by the structure of ultimate reality in itself – by a relation, in John Post's term, of "nonreductive determination"; and (3) that being placed in an eschatological relation is not the same as existing eschatologically, or authentically. Roughly speaking, being placed in an eschatological relation is the same as being called -- implicitly or explicitly -- to eschatological, or authentic, existence. But since a self is chosen only through its own choosing, actually existing eschatologically, or authentically, is a function of its freely and responsibly accepting the call so to exist.

12 May 2008unmigrated-wiki-markup

In my _Auseinandersetzung_ with Schussler Fiorenza (in the Appendix to "The Authority of Scripture for Preaching"), I remark that "it is not accidental that the term 'faith' plays practically no role at all in \ [her\] lexicon." The reason for this, I explain, is that she "shows not the least awareness that the possibility of existing and acting \ [morally and politically as Jesus acted, or calls us to act\] is not just a human possibility, or even the most radical form of such a possibility, but is rather an _eschatological_ possibility for which one must first be set free by the prevenient action of God's love accepted through obedient faith."

The question I need to pursue is just how the distinction made in this explanation between "just a human possibility" and "an eschatological possibility" is related to other, ostensibly similar or parallel distinctions I've been wont to make. I refer to such different distinctions as those between God's commandinents and God's command; God's specific gifts and demands through destiny and relation to neighbors and God's integral gift and demand of authentic existence; penultimate transformations and ultimate transformation; life-praxis and self-understanding as respectively the categorial and the transcendental levels of action or of living understandingly and so on.

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