The Notebooks of Schubert Ogden

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Logical-Type Distinctions 

We need a general or neutral idea of ultimate reality spanning the differences between all logical types, hence applicable, e.g., to individuals as well as to events or states and to abstract properties as well as to groups of individuals. So understood, "ultimate reality" contrasts only with "unreality," Il mere appearance," or "fiction.1I

But we also need several logical-type distinctions spanned by the utterly general or neutral idea of ultimate reality as such. Specifically, we need distinctions between:

(1) events (or states);

(2) individuals;

(3) groups of individuals (or aggregates);

(4) abstract qualities (or properties); and

(5) God. 

God constitutes a unique logical type, because, while God is an individual, insofar comparable with all other i ndi vi dua ls, God is onlyonly metaphysical, or necessarily existing, individual, insofar incomparable with all others. 

In some places, Hartshorne speaks of "1eve1s of existence,11 distinguishing three such: (1) lithe occurrence [sic!] of certa-in actual states of individuals"; (2) lithe existence of certain -individua1s"; (3) lithe existence of certain kinds of individuals or of certain class-properties^'l (LP: 63 f.; cf. RSP: 204 f.). Of these he says, lithe kinds^ [~. of individuals = class properties] cannot exist save in individuals, nor the individuals save in states; still, in which individuals or states they exist remains a further, a contingent determination." "Individuals exist in states, each of which can only be contingent; but that there ar~ states embodying the individual mayor may not be contingent, depending upon whether or not the definition of 'state of" Contingency is found wherever .,
one goes from the abstract toward the concrete. 'Something existsdoes not entail 'Animals exist,' this does notentail 'Foxes exist,' and this does not  entail, 'Fox here with torn left ear exists"' Any step toward concrete particularity is logically a non-necessary one. But, likewise, any step from the particular to the specific of which it is a particularization, or from the

contingent; but that there
ar~states embodying the individual mayor may not be contingent, depending upon whether or not the definition of 'state ofXI,.J..
specific to the generic of which it is a specialization, is logically necessary.
"'i()tvH:''involves any~r:2,itrary.__ se.Jectio!1" (LP: 64, 66). "Contingency is found wherever.,
,\"'\,r-...,,,one goes from the abstract toward the concrete. 'Something exists
entail 'Animals exist,' this does not entail 'Foxes exist,' and this does not
entail, 'Fox here with torn left ear exists"' Any step toward concrete particu
larity is logically a non-necessary one. But, likewise, any step from the particular to the specific of which it is a particularization, or from the
Idoes not

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