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Questions:
- If it's true that "no two contemporary occasions are derived from a past wholly in common" (AI: 259 f.), how can it also be true that "human experience is an act of self-origination including the whole [sic!] of nature" (290)?
- That occasions performing some common function in some percipient experience may thereby acquire the unity of a group for that percipient seems clear enough. But, surely, whether or not occasions constitute a nexus is independent of their performing some common function in some percipient experience. If any set of occasions in any way exhibits the basic property of "mutual immanence," it is a group—and, in particular, is the kind of group termed "nexus." And so, too, with other kinds of groups—societies, personally ordered societies and so on. So how can Whitehead say what he says in the opening sentence of Ch. XIII: The Grouping of Occasions?
20 October 2000
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