Hartshorne says that "\[v\]alue is in definiteness, and definiteness is 'the soul of actuality,'" or that II \[t\]he actual in its unity has quality or value, and this is no 'predicate' or bundle of predicates to which reference can, in a particular case, be made, save by pointing to the concrete and speaking of 'its' value" (Anselm's Discovery: 189, 227).
What Hartshorne means by this, I take it, is not, as one might infer, that possibilities, as distinct from actualities, have no value at all because they are relatively indeterminate, or determinable, but rather that-to put it in my
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terms-whereas thevaIue 0 f POSS1 1 1ties as sue IS \~lJ;al, e v ue proper
..,
to objects, properties, or abstracts, the value of actualities as such is intrinsic, the value proper to subjects, instances, or concretes.
11 October 2004