By Schubert Ogden
The Notebooks of Schubert Ogden
of qual ity, and of quantity as well
~le+:,.eR-3fH·p," all
-,inclusiveness," "internal relatedness," etc.?
21. Hartshorne's conclusion that "mind as such" is "the universal correlate16 II is scarcely warranted by his claim, however valid, that "any quality, to be known, must become a quality of experience in some form" (LP: 124). The only conclusion he seems entitled to draw is that mind as such is the universal correlate of quality, and of quantity as well, as known. But who would dispute this? On the other hand, who can get out of it what Hartshorne tries to get? The fact, even if it be a fact, that mind as subject is, indeed, the universal correlate of quality, is entirely compatible with mind as object being "a mere species of quality," give or take on the ques ti on-~~'~ epi thet. A* Hartshorne's claim that "an infinity of forms of conceivable feeling might be absent, and yet feeling might be present" (LP: 125) evidently presupposes that "feeling" is a proper analogical concept. But how does, or could, Hartshorne establish this? Of course, if feeling is a proper analogical concept, what he says is correct. But what entitles anyone to suppose that it is true? That an infinity of forms of conceivable internal relatedness might be present seems clear enough. But feeling--unless of course "feeling" is simply a word for such relatedness?
to be related,.' is not convertible--which, again, is just the question.
24. To Hartshorne's rhetorical question, "at what point does the refusal to011'generalize concepts 'rashly'8* beyond good sense become merely the inability ."or refusal to generalize-period?" I answer, obviously not the point beyond which no further predictive power is achieved, but the point beyond which nothing is or could be known to be added to what can already be said without the generalizations-either in concepts that are already utterly general or by means of other concepts used symbolically or metaphorically (LP: 128).
does, or could, Hartshorne distinguish what he means by 1l1 ove
less meaningful than IIrelativity to some" and IIrelativity to none.
28. Why the IIspeculativeinevitabl~. But the question, of course, is how Hartshorne knows, or could know, that this distinction applies to the term "love." Of course, if "love" expresses a proper analogy, what he says is true. But the question is precisely whether "love" does, or can, express such an analogy, and Hartshorne doesn't answer this question but merely begs it-by asserting "flatly" that "human love is a particular form"! Moreover, how 19 ll in saying that lithe manner in which it figures as the base of our analogy is logically nonrestrictivell from II relativity,1I lIinternal relatedness ll ? When "whatever is special or odd about human love,1I or, more generally, about creaturely love is abstracted from, what is left except "relativityll as a transcendental? Thus, for all Hartshorne shows, as distinct from merely asserting, lito say that love must be limited in flexibility" is not IImerely one of the many ways in which the positivistic alternative to theism may be put" (LP: 101). For, however limited the flexibility of love may be, there need be no limit set to the flexibility of "relativity,1I because, "relativity to all il is and must be no 1Ill in IIspeculative philosophy," which Hartshorne takes as synonymous with "metaphysicsll (lia general speculative philosophy or metaphysicsll [LP: xiii]), as well as identifies as his own IIcause" (lithe cause of speculative philosophyll [LP: 10])? Presumably, if philosophy essentially involves generalization, in the sense of refining and extending the "ordinary meaningsll of terms (as Hartshorne insists it does--in e.g., LP: 219, RSP: 85), there's nothi ng else for it to be except "specul ati ve. " But what if metaphysics is conceived in the way Hartshorne conceives it when he says that it is lIessentially a question of the logical structure of concepts,1I of so analyzing the concepts and propositions of ordinary experience as to explicate their transcendental implications? Wherein need there be anything IIspeculativell about this? Note how Hartshorne contrasts 'methodological materialism' (bet
IIter, 'physicalism')" \rlith lithe speculative psychical ism which alone can escape dualism without denial of any given aspects of reality" (CSPM: 54).20
29. "Even analogical affirmations should commit one to something" (LP: 37). But to what? I submit: to the logic or logical structure of the concepts involved in the affirmations, in the sense of the "rules" or "laws" explicative of the meaning of these concepts. Thus, to say that God could have created a world other than any world he does create is to imply that there are unactualized potentialities in God, that God is not actus purus--or conversely. Is,...-~V1"1 o.v·or could, Hartshorne be.t-commi tted to any~ than this? .;/" 30. Hartshorne reasons that the classification of certain "descriptions" of God, besides "obviously formal" and "obviously material" ideas about God, "depends partly upon one's philosophical beliefs" (LP: l39). How so? If you are a panpsychist, "psychical concepts are categorial, universal in scope," so that "to say God has awareness, feeling, memory, sympathy" is not to make the "material statement" it may seem to be, but, rather, to make an "analogical" statement. On the contrary, if you do not hold panpsychist philosophical be-Pcur.:sliefs, to say this is to make a material statement, on allfol"ffi~ with "ob
.;1viously material II statements, IIfor . some rather than all creatures have these sc. psychical] qualities.
in scope," in the sense that they are "universally applicable to concrete singulars"?
22
explain any other sense in which he is using the word. They cannot possibly be literal
'know,' to 'feel,' to 'remember'--here there are qualitative differences which are not easily covered by empty terms like 'way' or 'degree'li (154). God obviously does not know as a man knows, any more than a dog knows as man knows. But, then, to say that IIGod knows" cannot be to make a 1iteral statement, in the sense in which IIGod is relative" is a literal statement. Nor can it be literal even when "relative" is understood to mean "relative in the way or to the degree in which the universal individual alone can be relative," because even then there remain the "qualitative differences" between God's knowing and our own or a dog's.1I But why IIdepends partlyll? Because, "even assuming panpsychism, the most general psychical terms, though universally applicable to concrete singulars .. are not purely formal in the same sense as the other categorial terms." But, surely, the sophisticated panpsychist is well aware of this? In reality, then, the classification of analogical "descri pti ons" of dei ty depends wholly upon one I s phil osophi ca 1 bel i efs ! The obvious question, then, is as to the justification of these beliefs. What warrants panpsychism, not relatively to other equally "speculative,1I or "gnostic," options such as "dualism" and "materialism" ( materialistic monism), but absolutely, i.e., as the claim that II psychical concepts are categorial, universal 21 I 'will,' 'love'] which is applicable to all individuals whatever, from atoms to deity" (CSPM: 154). Thus they are distinct from "very specific terms like 'shepherd,'" on the one hand, which apply only to "quite specific sorts of things, definite items found here and there in existence" (152), and from "very abstract terms like 'relative,'11 on the other, because of the "still wider applicability, or greater abstractness, of the strictly categorial Aotions [. like 'relative ' or 'finite ' ]," whose meaning "does not vary from one level to another in the scale of beings" (154). But what if one allows as how "relative" has a different sense, which can be specified "quite literally," depending on whether it is understood to apply to individuals, or events, on the one hand, or to groups of individuals and abstractions, on the other? Are terms like IIknowledge,1I IIwill," "1 ove ," when used in their "legitimate broadest possible meaning," distinct from terms like "relative," when used with reference to concrete singulars (as distinct from abstractions and groups)? If they are still distinct, wherein does their distinctiveness lie, and how can one know them to be thus distinctive? ~ because~ while lito be 'constituted in some way by contingent relations' is simply and literally that, no more~ no less, and no other," lito Consequently~ if there is any sense in which these "prob{~}
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