1412. Concrescence as such

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Concrescence is the only reality that is entirely self-explanatory, because it feeds on nothing other than its own products and qualities, i.e., on concretes and the more or less specific abstracts instantiated by them.

As for what is wholly nonconcrete, in that it has never grown together, this is simply the universal common denominator of concrescence as such and whatever it, in turn, implies—namely, both divine and nondivine levels or forms of concrescence, and thus also concretes.

This means, among other things, that if a concept refers neither to a producible product or quality of concrescence nor to some abstract aspect of concrescence itself, then it does not refer at all and is insofar forth void of coherent meaning.

Logical modalities and, by implication, all concepts whatever, refer essentially to concrescence. To be "necessary" ontologically is to be inherent in concrescence as such, apart from which being either "actual" ontologically or "potential" ontologically has no meaning.

Thought always implies reality, even if in some cases uninstantiated predicates are part (but never all) of what thought is about. The reality one is thinking of when one thinks of realities whose unreality is genuinely conceivable is concrescence as such, as having the two essential aspects of divine and nondivine concrescence, which instead of producing the reality in question, might produce or might have produced some other realities instead.

The indispensable minimum of what thought is about is concrescence as such, as having the two essential aspects of divine and nondivine concrescence (God in some possible state and some world or other).

Thought and reality belong in principle together. Thought is about reality, and reality is what is or can be thought about. Not that all thoughts represent actualities, that is, fully actualized possibilities; rather, all thought, not absurd or inconsistent, represents either something necessary, which never was merely future, or something contingent that once was [merely] future, i.e., was a real possibility for subsequent actualization, and also for nonactualization.