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1.  Analysis  discloses  that  "real"  and  its  cognates  are  systematically  ambig­uous,  in  that,  while  it has  a  "field-invariant  force,"  it has  "field-depend­ent  standards."  This  is  not  surprising,  of  course,  because  the  same  syste­matic  ambiguity  attends  "true"  and  its  cognates,  with  which  "real"  and  its cognates  are  correlative.  For  this  reason;  then,  one  could  say  that  the  dis­tinction  between  "being-in-itself"  and  "meaning-for-us"  is  misleading,  insofar as  it implies,  or  appears  to  imply,  that  "reality"  is  not  thus  systematically ambiguous,  and  hence  field-dependent  as  well  as  field-invariant. 

1.  Analysis discloses that  "real" and  its cognates are  systematically  ambig­uous,  in  that,  while  it has  a  "field-invariant  force,"  it has  "field-depend­ent  standards."  This is not surprising,  of  course,  because  the  same  systematic  ambiguity  attends  "true"  and  its  cognates,  with  which "real"  and  its cognates  are  correlative.  For  this  reason;  then,  one  could  say  that  the  dis­tinction  between  "being-in-itself"  and  "meaning-for-us"  is misleading,  insofar as  it implies,  or  appears  to  imply,  that  "reality"  is  not  thus  systematically ambiguous,  and  hence  field-dependent  as  well  as field-invariant.

2.  But  this  is  in  no  way  to  say  that  there  is  not  a  difference  within  any given  field  between  what  is  real  and  what  is  not.  For  if what  is  real,  given some  mode  of  reasoning,  some  way  of  taking  account  of  things  that  we  are  in one  way  or  another  obliged  to  take  account  of,  is,  indeed,  relative  to  this mode  of  reasoning,  this  way  of  taking  account  of  things,  it is  not  in  the  least relative  to  any  particular  conclusion  arrived  at within  this  mode  of  reasoning or  way  of  taking  account  of  things.  In  other  words,  there  remains  the  distinc­tion  between  what  is  believed  to  be  true,  given  this  mode  of  reasoning,  and what  is  worthy  of  being  believed  true, given  the  standards  established  by  this same  mode  of  reasoning.  In  this  sense,  one  could  say  that  the  distinction between  "being-in-itself"  and  "meaning-for-us"  is  both  pertinent  and  important, insofar  as  it expresses,  or  is  taken  to  express,  that  what  is  worthy  of  being believed  is  one  thing,  what  in  fact  is  believed,  something  irreducibly  different. 
3.  It would  appear  clear  enough,  then,  that)however  religious  utterances  rep­resent  a  mode  of  reasoning,  or  a  way  of  taking  account  of  what  we  are  somehow obliged  to  take  account  of,  within  that  mode  or  way  there  is  a  distinction  be­tween  what  is  worthy  of  being  believed  and  what  in  fact  is  believed,  and  hence sufficient  reason  to  employ  the  distinction  between  "being-in-itself"  and "meaning-for-us."  It would  appear  to  be  no  less  clear  that  no  religious  ut­terance  could  be  said  to  be  true  that  did  not  speak  about  the  reality  it pur­ports  to  be  about  not  only  in  its meaning  for-us  but  also  in  its  being-in­itself--not  only  as  what  we  in  fact  believe,  but  also  as  what  is  worthy  of our  belief,  whether  we  in  fact  believe  it or  not. 

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