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Questions:

1. Wiki MarkupIf it's true that "no two contemporary occasions are derived from a past wholly in common" (_AI_: 259 f.), how can it also be true that "human experience is an act of self-origination including the whole \ [_sic\!_\] of nature" (290)?
2. That occasions performing some common function in some percipient experience may thereby acquire the unity of a group for that percipient seems clear enough. But, surely, whether or not occasions constitute a nexus is independent of their performing some common function in some percipient experience. If any set of occasions in any way exhibits the basic property of "mutual immanence," it is a group – andgroup—and, in particular, is the kind of group termed "nexus." And so, too, with other kinds of groups – societiesgroups—societies, personally ordered societies and so on. So how can Whitehead say what he says in the opening sentence of Ch. XIII: The Grouping of Occasions?

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