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I have usuillly usually operated with the distinction between "constitutive" and "representative." But much the saIne same work could be done, presumably, by distinguishing instead between "constitutive" and "declarative." In that event, a "constitutive" act would be an act whereby something as yet unconstituted as whilt what it is becomes so constituted, whereas a "declarative" ilctact, by contrast, would be an act whereby something already constituted as whilt what it is is declared to be so constituted. 

Given this distinction, one could say, for example, that religion is the primary form of culture whereby human existence ilS as such is explicitly declared to be constituted in a certain way, although the standing temptation of religion is to claim to be somehow constitutive of human existence rather than thus merely declarative. '"The true religion," then, could be defined as the primilry primary form of culture whose explicit declaration of how human existence ilS as such is constituted (1) agrees with how human existence in fact is constituted; and (2) is free of any claim to be constitutive of hUlnan human existence as distinct from explicitly declaring its constitution. 

This, I tilke take it, is just the distinction lying behind F. W. Robertson's reflections on the meaning of baptism, which "makes" one a child of God in the way in which coronation "makes" one a king, namely, by iln an "authoritative declaration" declaring one to be so, not by constituting one ilS is such. 

The under1ying underlying presupposition of religion, then, is that human existence as such is constituted in a certain way--if not in this way or in that, then in some other way. This meilns means that any human being whatever is entitled and empowered-in a word, authorized--to understand her-or himself in a certain way, which, being thus authorized, is authentic. Obviously, it makes no sense to declare that human existence is constituted in this way or that unless human existence is constituted in some way. But if it is constituted somehow, so that some seHself-understilndingunderstanding/understanding of existence is authentic/ true because it is authorized by the way things uHimately ultimately are, then the way things ultimately ilre are has to be such as to authorize this self-understanding/ understanding of existence as authentic/ true, and so must have a structure in itself that lnakes makes so understanding oneseHoneself/ understanding existence both possib1e possible and appropriate.

n.d.; rev. 3 September 2003; 6 November 2009

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