The Notebooks of Schubert Ogden

You are viewing an old version of this page. View the current version.

Compare with Current View Page History

Version 1 Next »

SCANNED PDF

I have usuillly operated with the distinction between "constitutive" and "representative." But much the saIne work could be done, presumably, by distinguishing instead between "constitutive" and "declarative." In that event, a "constitutive" act would be an act whereby something as yet unconstituted as whilt it is becomes so constituted, whereas a "declarative" ilct, by contrast, would be an act whereby something already constituted as whilt it is is declared to be so constituted. 

Given this distinction, one could say, for example, that religion is the primary form of culture whereby human existence ilS such is explicitly declared to be constituted in a certain way, although the standing temptation of religion is to claim to be somehow constitutive of human existence rather than thus merely declarative. 'The true religion," then, could be defined as the primilry form of culture whose explicit declaration of how human existence ilS such is constituted (1)agrees with how human existence in fact is constituted; and (2) is free of any claim to be constitutive of hUlnan existence as distinct from explicitly declaring its constitution. 

This, I tilke it, is just the distinction lying behind F. W. Robertson's reflections on the meaning of baptism, which "makes" one a child of God in the way in which coronation "makes" one a king, namely, by iln "authoritative declaration" declaring one to be so, not by constituting one ilS such. 

The under1ying presupposition of religion, then, is that human existence as such is constituted in a certain way-if not in this way or in that, then in some other way. This meilns that any human being whatever is entitled and empowered-in a word, authorized-to understand her-or himself in a certain way, which, being thus authorized, is authentic. Obviously, it makes no sense to declare that human existence is constituted in this way or that unless human existence is constituted in some way. But if it is constituted somehow, so that some seH-understilnding/ understanding of existence is authentic/ true because it is authorized by the way things uHimately are, then the way things ultimately ilre has to be such as to authorize this self-understanding/ understanding ofexistence as authentic/ true, and so must have a structure in itself that lnakes so understanding oneseH/ understanding existence both possib1e and appropriate.

n.d.; rev. 3 September 2003; 6 November 2009

.

  • No labels