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Now as before, Haberll1as Habermas is, for I11eme, a tantalizing figure. On the one hand, he refuses the extrel11ism extremism of a one-dill1ensional dimensional concept of reason such as naturalism and/or scientisin represent/sscientisim represents; on the other hand, he never quite achieves the "1110re more comprehensive concept of reason," or "the multidimensional concept of reason" (19, 16), that he apparently holds up as the relevant philosophical ideal. Just what "the cognitive substance," or the "profane truth content," of the religions is ever relnains remains uncertain. Instead of proceeding methodically and making the necessary distinctions as Inatters matters of principle, he seen1S siinply seems simply to pick and choose, revealing in doing so how much he is still liinited limited by a secularistic understanding of the nature of things. This is, to 111y 111indmy mind, disclosed in an interesting way when he says, chtlracteristicallycharacteristically, that "post-metaphysical thought is prepared to learn from religion but rell1ains remains agnostic in the process" (17). If this I11eans means anything other than that post-ll1etaphysical metaphysical thought is prepared to learn everything from religion but the one thing that religion is prepared to teach, Habermas never makes clear why one should think so. 2007

Of course, it is at least possible that he, in his way, is only doing what I'ln m trying to do in 111inemine-and that what he dismisses as "metaphysics" is retllly really only the kind of qtlasiquasi-, pseudo-factuat factual, supernaturalist confusion that much ll1etaphysics metaphysics does indeed continue to be, adjectivally if not substantively. But, as I've said, he's a tantalizing figure-and not least because it seeins i111possible seems impossible to detern1ine determine whether, or what extent, this is arlything anything more than a possibility.

4 April 2007