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Now as before, Haberll1as is, for I11e, a tantalizing figure. On the one hand, he refuses the extrel11ism of a one-dill1ensional concept of reason such as naturalism and/or scientisin represent/s; on the other hand, he never quite achieves the "1110re comprehensive concept of reason," or "the multidimensional concept of reason" (19, 16), that he apparently holds up as the relevant philosophical ideal. Just what "the cognitive substance," or the "profane truth content," of the religions is ever relnains uncertain. Instead of proceeding methodically and making the necessary distinctions as Inatters of principle, he seen1S siinply to pick and choose, revealing in doing so how much he is still liinited by a secularistic understanding of the nature of things. This is, to 111y 111ind, disclosed in an interesting way when he says, chtlracteristically, that "post-metaphysical thought is prepared to learn from religion but rell1ains agnostic in the process" (17). If this I11eans anything other than that post-ll1etaphysical thought is prepared to learn everything from religion but the one thing that religion is prepared to teach, Habermas never makes clear why one should think so. 2007

Of course, it is at least possible that he, in his way, is only doing what I'ln trying to do in 111ine-and that what he dismisses as "metaphysics" is retllly only the kind of qtlasi-, pseudo-factuat supernaturalist confusion that much ll1etaphysics does indeed continue to be, adjectivally if not substantively. But, as I've said, he's a tantalizing figure-and not least because it seeins i111possible to detern1ine whether, or what extent, this is arlything more than a possibility.

4 April