By Schubert Ogden
The Notebooks of Schubert Ogden
I have written that "religious or theological statements are existential statements [sc. to the first power, in the proper sense], although the foundational assertions among them neither are nor could be factual assertions" ("Linguistic Analysis and Theology": 325). But this will hardly do-for two reasons:
(1) because no religious or theological statements simply are existential statements (whether to the first power, in the proper sense, only, or also to the second power, in the emphatic sense with respect to what they are about), but rather (being existential in the third sense, also to the second power, in the emphatic sense with respect to how they are about what they are about) necessarily imply existential statements (to the first power only—in the case of the statements their existential-historical statements imply—or also to the second power—in the case of the statements their existential-transcendental statements imply); and
(2) because "the foundational assertions" among religious or theological statements (including as they do existential-historical as well as existential-transcendental assertions) necessarily imply factual statements (in the case of foundational existential-historical assertions) as well as metaphysical statements (in the case of foundational existential-transcendental assertions).
In sum: (1) religious or theological statements are not themselves existential statements, although they necessarily imply such; and (2) foundational religious or theological assertions necessarily imply factual as well as metaphysical statements.
23 November 2005
Overview
Content Tools