By Schubert Ogden
The Notebooks of Schubert Ogden
1. Whether or not Y's believing p simply because X enunciates p is reasonable depends on whether or not X's de facto epistemic authority for Y is also legitimate or valid, i.e., de jure, authority. And this depends, in turn, on X's de facto epistemic authority also being a grounded epistemic authority.
2. X's de facto epistemic authority for Y is a grounded epistemic authority if, and only if, it is possible for someone—if not Y, then others—to test X's claims to knowledge in realm R. This means (1) that knowledge of what X claims to know can be attained otherwise than by relying on some epistemic authority; and (2) that there is an independent criterion by which all claims to knowledge in R can be tested.
July 1996
Overview
Content Tools