728. I have argued ...

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I have argued elsewhere (Notebooks, 7 November 2006) that "Bultmann uses 'science' in a systematically ambiguous way," because it can mean either of two different things: either "science that objectifies existence into being within the world," or "science that talks about existence without objectifying it into being within the world" (NTM: 101). In either case, however, "objectifying thinking" is involved, even though in the second case it does not involve thinking about existence objectifyingly as simply another instance of being in the world.

But, then, if faith transcends objectifying thinking -- period, it transcends the thinking of science in both senses of the term. This means that the relation of believers to the objectifying thinking of philosophy and theology is just as paradoxical -- just as much a matter of "as if not" (ως μη) -- as it is to the world and to the world picture of modern natural science (cf. 123). In other words, if one is a Christian, one must do theology as well as philosophy in the same way in which one is to do everything else: as if one were not doing it.

20 January 2010

That Bultmann uses "science" in a systematically ambiguous way is clear from the distinction he makes between different senses in which science can be understood. It can be understood both as "science that objectifies existence into being within the world" and as "science that talks about existence without objectifying it into being within the world" (NTM: 101; cf. 102 ff.: "where by 'science' is understood the science of objectifying thinking"; and "the kind of objectifying science that objectifies human being into being within the world," as distinct from "a science that is nothing other than the clear and methodical development of the understanding of existence that is given with existence itself").

7 November 2006