920. Hartshorne is doubtless right that . . .

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Hartshorne is doubtless right that the "more" than the logical constants included in "informal logic," or "logic in a broad sense," is furnished by "phenomenology, or theory of experience as such." But, surely, the relevant question is how "logic in a broad sense," which is to say, metaphysics, makes use of the "more" that phenomenology furnishes. My contention is that it makes use of it as the object of a properly intellectual analysis of experience as such, i.e., an analysis directed toward explicating the essential structure(s) of such experience. Presupposed by such an analysis, of course, is that experience as such is the privileged sample of concreteness as such, analysis of the most completely general structure(s) of which is metaphysics' proper business.

5 June 2005