1027. Hartshorne's talk of . . .

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1. Hartshorne's talk of "the ideal of equality," together with his resolute denial of "literal universal equality," parallels Singer's argument for "the principle of equal consideration of interests" as the "basic principle of equality," which is not based on any actual equality which all people share" (19, 27).

2. One apparent difference, however, is that Hartshorne takes account, as Singer does not seem to do, of the difference between human interests and other relevant interests. To be sure, Hartshorne's view is also different from a view like Rawls's, according to which human equality can be founded on the "range property" of being a "moral personality," since in Hartshorne's view there is "overwhelming evidence that being human, in any but the crudely physical sense, is a matter of degree, and, therefore, involves inequality. Despite the fact that "all reasonably normal human beings are exalted far above the non-human creatures which lack the capacity to symbolize any but the simplest feelings or thoughts, if even that, and in whom mere physical inheritance is decisive, rather than cultural inheritance," there are nevertheless radical individual differences between human beings in both degree and kind of abilities that are distinctively human. Even so, Hartshorne is insistent that, again, apart from idiots or near idiots, actual human beings are all sufficiently different from non-human creatures to justify assigning priority to their interests as distinct from the interests of such other creatures. There is at least a rough equality or mutuality in human relationships insofar as no creature who, through symbols, is made capable of reflective decisions will willingly permit others to make all but the most trivial decisions for him or her. Where one has capacity to weigh ends and means and compare values, one will expect to take part somehow in the collective decisions by which one's life is largely determined. Thus if human beings are to cooperate willingly, each must feel that she is an end, and not a mere means to the end of others and, therefore, must be treated as such, which is to say, as the reflective decision making creature she is. If this consideration in no way warrants speaking of a literal equality of worth among human beings, it does warrant setting certain restrictions to the extent to which inequality can or should be tolerated.

3. In what respects, then, are human beings more or less equal?
1) They are all equally dependent at birth for survival and human development, especially emotional and moral, upon the care of others.
2) They are all equally helpless to avoid eventual death.
3) Each of them, as a distinct and conscious animal organism, is equally under the necessity of making some decision every moment as to his or her next step.
4) The essential human capacities of each of them will not be apparent at first and will develop only given suitable opportunities; also, they will in some respects always be beyond the reach of definitive human judgment.
5) Each of them is radically above all the lower animals in ability to speak, or otherwise symbolize thought.

4. Granted, then, that a person is not an idiot or near idiot, we have to respect him or her as a fellow human being. This means adopting the principles of universal opportunity and universal participation (again, near idiots and criminals apart) in collective decisions.

5. Singer's appeal to "the feeling of hopeless inferiority that can exist when members of one race or sex are always worse off than members of another race or the other sex" (44 f.) as well as to the fact that "severe inequality between races means a divided community with consequent racial tension" (45) would seem to indicate that he does, after all, tacitly assume the difference that Hartshorne makes explicit. Clearly, only a being endowed with the capacity to use symbols could experience "the feeling of hopeless
inferiority" or be part of "a divided community," etc.