1358. I have had to rethink . . .

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I have had to rethink the whole question of the similarity as well as the difference between materialism (and / or dualism) and objective idealism / psychicalism as alternative metaphysical positions.

If my argument is sound that what Hartshorne takes the metaphysician to be saying "analogically," as distinct from either "symbolically" or "literally," cannot, in fact, be so distinguished except verbally, and that the metaphysician, therefore, must be saying something in one of these other two ways if it is to count as saying anything meaningful at all, then to speak of mind (or psyche) "in general," or "in some form," is utterly nichtssagend—not a whit less so than to speak of matter in the same completely generalized sense. In other words, if Hartshorne is right, as I agree he is, that "matter," used thus analogically, explains absolutely nothing that can't be explained without it, I don't see why I'm not likewise right, that "mind" so used explains just as little. If you can't even say what "mind in general," or "mind in some form," means, you certainly can't use it to explain anything!

I submit that the burden of explaining things metaphysically can be borne only by terms used neither "symbolically" nor "analogically," but strictly "literally." Of course, once such a strictly literal explanation has been provided, it may well be "interpreted," for one purpose or another, in symbolic terms. But any such "interpretation" adds nothing whatever to the explanation itself, which can be provided, if at all, only in strictly literal terms. Thus X is the effect of Y, or X is caused by Y, not because X "somehow experiences" Y, or Y is "somehow experienced by" X, but because, or insofar as, X is really, internally related to Y, while Y, in that relation, at least, is only logically, externally related to X. Or, again, atoms act as they do, not—as Hartshorne says—because "they sense and feel as they do," but because "they are internally related as they are (to the future as (well as to the past), i.e., as concrete singulars that, as such, instantiate all three of Peirce's categories: [t]hirdness as well as [s]econdness and [f]irstness" (Notebooks, 21 July 2008).

If one claims in reply, then, that, to say, "atoms act as they do because they sense and feel as they do," is to say "more" than that "atoms act as they do because they are internally / externally related as they are," wherein does the "more" consist? And can one specify it at once clearly and consistently, without logical fallacy?

I maintain that Hartshorne, as one who makes the claim, never explains more than verbally wherein the "more" consists. And I maintain, further, that, in the nature of the case, neither he nor anyone else can ever sufficiently specify the "more" both clearly and consistently – and also nonfallaciously.

When I say that Hartshorne fails to explain other than verbally what the claimed "more" consists in, I mean that he never says anything about the "more" other than that it consists in "experience (sentience or feeling) in general," or "in some form." But, clearly, phrases such as "experience (sentience, feeling) in some form," or "experience (sentience, feeling) in general," are inherently vague and anything but clear. What form, exactly? And what are the variables; that define "experience (sentience, feeling) in general," and of which any form of experience is presumably a value? Are they – or can they be – more than verbally different from the strictly literal variables that serve to define "concreteness" as a certain mode of internal / external relatedness? Of course, unless they are – or can be – there is really nothing "more" said after all. But, then, wherein, exactly, does the "more" consist, and how is it to be specified sufficiently to remove the inherent vagueness of Hartshorne's terms by being shown to be really, not merely verbally, "more"? And could it be even possibly so specified without in some way committing the "pathetic fallacy" of treating a merely particular or "local" variable as though it were universal or "cosmic"? Or – to put the same question more cautiously – how could one show that one had not committed this fallacy in so specifying it?

For all Hartshorne ever shows to the contrary, the supposed "analogical" variables defining the alleged "more" remain at most verbally different from the strictly literal variables that suffice to define "concreteness," which is to say, a certain mode of relatedness, internal and also external, distinctive of concretes and thus distinct from the modes distinctive of other logical / ontological types, such as abstracts generally and transcendentals (and also, in their way, existentiaIs) specifically.

17 August 2009; rev. 16 October 2009