1484. To accept the ultimacy of process . . .

SCANNED PDF

To accept the ultimacy of process or creativity is to hold that reality, and hence what is true of reality, is richer in definiteness at each new moment. Far from being "eternal," the truth about an occurrence comes into being with, or at some finite time just before, the occurrence. 

If theism, properly defined, is good grammar, it cannot fail to be true, since its denial is, in any case, bad grammar and so necessarily false. 

The contrast inherent in basic concepts should not be repudiated by assigning exclusive validity to only one side of the contrast. 

The most completely abstract general terms applicable to God are literal in that application. To be sure, there is always a difference between their application to God and all of their other applications. But this difference itself can be stated literally. 

Contrary to the negative theology, some concepts must apply to God positively (and literally), since where there are no definite common aspects, there are no definite contrasts either. E.g., if God is not positively (and literally) cause or influence, God cannot contrast with all other beings as cosmically rather than merely locally causative or influential.

All of the transcendental features of reality must be features of God if God is literally being, or reality, itself. Thus God must be conditioned as well as unconditioned, actual as well as potential, relative as well as absolute. concrete as well as abstract. E.g., God is universal cause, and God is universal effect. 

If discussion about God is to be properly rational, there must be:

(1) rules or principles valid for all individuals, not excluding God, and so definitive of individuality as such;

(2) rules or principles valid for all individuals other than God, and so definitive of nondivine individuality;

(3) rules or principles valid solely for God, and so definitive of divine individuality;

(4) a criterion for the distinction between the two sets of rules or principles; and

(5) reasons why the distinction needs to be made.

The idea of God itself must entail a logical-ontological type difference between God and everything else.

God in God's eternal aspect is no mere case under the transcendentals, nor yet a mere exception to them. Rather, God is the transcendentals in their pure or unqualified, i.e., transcendental, meaning as fixed characteristics of an individual life within which there is a duality of perfect and imperfect cases, the former necessarily including the latter. 

There is a pretension inherent in theism as such to the effect that the unique excellence of God implies a logical-ontological type difference between God and any other individual, actual or possible; and that, for this reason, each transcendental other than God itself has, and must have, two levels of possible meaning: the ordinary one, applicable to all things other than God, and the extraordinary one, applicable to God alone.

15 February 1999