1497. Is Peirce right . . .

SCANNED PDF

Is Peirce right after all in arguing for a minimum of three categories (i.e., Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness)? 

Perhaps one reason for thinking so is that there does seem to be a difference between the kind of generic or indeterminate necessity with which completely general abstracts (i.e., transcendentals) require concretes to instantiate them and the other kind with which both less than completely general abstracts (i.e., categories, genera, species, individualities) and concretes require concretes to instantiate or objectify them—both of these kinds being distinct from the kind of specific or determinate necessity with which concretes require the other concretes they objectify. In other words, because there are indeed three different degrees of relativity, or three forms of dependence, a case may be made for a minimum of three categories. 

Whereas completely general abstracts (i.e., transcendentals) are utterly nonrestrictive with respect to the kind(s) of concretes they require to instantiate them, this is not true either of less than completely general abstracts (i.e., categories, genera, species, individualities) or of concretes, both of which are more or less restrictive with respect to the kind(s) of concretes they require to instantiate or objectify them. 

Would it make sense, then, to distinguish between two kinds of generic or indeterminate necessity, one of which would be the kind with which completely general abstracts (i.e., transcendentals) require concretes to instantiate them, while the other would be the kind with which both less than completely general abstracts (i.e., categories, genera, species, individualities) and concretes require concretes to instantiate or objectify them? If such a distinction would make sense, we could perhaps express it by speaking of absolutely/relatively generic or indeterminate necessity—or possibly—wholly/partially generic or indeterminate necessity. 

Alternatively, it might be possible to distinguish between the utterly undifferentiated necessity with which completely general abstracts (i.e., transcendentals) require concretes to instantiate them and the more or less differentiated necessity with which both less than completely general abstracts (i.e., categories, genera, species, individualities) and concretes require concretes to instantiate or objectify them—both of these kinds of generic or indeterminate necessity being distinct from the kind of specific or determinate necessity with which concretes require the other concretes they objectify. 

28 September 2000