1501. Whole Issue of "logic(al) . . .

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Concerning the whole issue of "logic(al) in a broad sense," distinctions may be made between three levels:

(1) syntactic;

(2) semantic; and

(3) pragmatic. 

Given these distinctions, then, one may say, first, that the contradictories of true mathematical and logical assertions, "logic(al)," are self-contradictory on the in the usual narrow sense of "Iogic(al)," are self-contradictory even on thelevel; second, that the contradictories of true strictly metaphysical assertions, or, if you will, logical assertions in the by no means usual broad sense of semantic, even if not on the syntactic) level; and third, that the contradictories of true broadly metaphysical assertions are self-contradictory on the pragmatic, even if not on the semantic level. 

Finally, one may say, in terms of Passmore's distinction, first, that contradictories of assertions that are self-contradictory on either the syntactic or the semantic level are, in their different ways,second, that contradictories of assertions that are self-contradictory on the pragmatic level are "absolutely self-refuting"; and "pragmatically self-refuting."

rev. 23 October 1998