1770. What do I mean when I claim . . .

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What do I mean when I claim, implicitly or explicitly, that a statement is true?

I mean, first of all, that reality, or the real, in the sense of "the inclusive something" (Hartshorne), or "the totality of what is known about" (Rorty/Dennett), includes what I assert to be the case in so using a statement as to make or imply this kind of a claim to validity.

But I also mean, secondly, that the statement is valid in that it is worthy of being believed, because there are good and sufficient reasons of some kind that can be given to establish such worthiness for any believer whatever, potential as well as actual

(If so-called correspondence theories of truth exploit the first of these two aspects of what is meant in claiming that a statement is true, so-called consensus theories of truth presumably exploit the second aspect. On my analysis, however, neither theory, whatever its merits, is adequate by itself, each requiring the thematization distinctive of the other for its own completion.)

Excluding, then, the nonexistential statements of logic and mathematics, one may distinguish two kinds of (existential) statements: (1) statements of fact (verités de fait), or contingent statements; and (2) statements of principle (verités de raison), or necessary statements. Accordingly, to assert these kinds of statements so as to express or imply the claim that they are true means:

(1) with respect to statements of fact, or contingent statements, first of all, that reality, or the real, includes, and yet need not have included, what one asserts to be the case in asserting the statements; and, secondly, that the statements are valid in that they are worthy of being believed, because, while there are some at least conceivable experiences that would serve to falsify them, there are also at least some other experiences that serve to verify them; and

(2) with respect to statements of principle, or necessary statements, first of all, that reality, or the real, includes, and could not conceivably fail to include, what one asserts to be the case in asserting the statements; and, secondly, that the statements are valid in that they are worthy of being believed, because, while there are no even conceivable experiences that could serve to falsify them, any experience whatever is sufficient to verify them.

8 July 1982; rev. 19 August 2003