1891. What is the datum of which philosophy . . .

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What is the datum of which philosophy is the critical analysis?

". . . as the man to the cell, the divine to the man would be a vague environment rather than a definite social other [190/191] . . . the vagueness which inevitably limits the direct vision which we men could possibly have of God gives us plenty of freedom of interpretation of the divine datum, this freedom going all the way to denying that there is a God. An indistinct datum can always be explained away, if not completely, still sufficiently for a good many purposes" (MVG, 190 f.). 

". . . it is said that since we know God not directly but through the creatures, and since he is not a creature but the creator, we must know him through negation essentially. But if God is known wholly indi­rectly, then he cannot be immanent in experience, and this conflicts with his ubiquity and immensity. Even Aquinas will be found admitting that we are not wholly without direct awareness of God, quite apart from spe­cial revelation or mystic states" (MVG, 123). 

"As for the idea that as created beings we can know God only as he is not, or as he is in the creatures not as he is in himself, this idea I believe to be crude. It is vagueness, not blank ignorance, that we have to struggle against. The whole idea of religion, at any rate, is precisely that we can know God as he is in himself (though vaguely), for we know him through love, and love is 'taking the standpoint of the other' (Mead). . . . God as cause is in his effects, and God as cause is God himself. We do not know the creatures at all, if theism is sound, just in themselves, and then by negating their limitations infer God. On the contrary (and this is why human friendship is no substitute for religious love), we know ourselves and everything else in relation to our dim but direct sense of God's love, with which we are one by our subconscious but inalienable returning love for him. The arguments by which it is held to be shown that God cannot be positively (even though vaguely) known by us simply beg the question, turning as they do on the characteristic categories of first-type theism [127/128], such as the idea of a being wholly without accidents, hence having no essence dis­tinguishable from accidents, etc." (MVG, 127 f.). 

"The philosopher (sc. Whitehead) himself once told his students that (I quote from memory), 'as physics is the interpretation of our ex­ternal perceptual experiences, so metaphysics is the interpretation of our religious experiences'" (The Relevance of Whitehead, p. 25). 

"Just as science has refined upon primitive ideas derived from external particular perceptions, so philosophy has refined upon ideas derived from more internal and pervasive experiences" (PSG, p. 479).

". . . theological [sc. philosophical-theological] terms, though literal, derive this literal meaning from intuitions which are not con­spicuous in normal human experience, and must be carefully distinguished from other, more conspicuous intuitions with which they may be confused. What we need . . . is not metaphors to convey the meaning, but the thor­ough elimination of the metaphorical meanings which are always threaten­ing to substitute themselves; thus the notions of God as judge or as monarch are highly and dangerously metaphorical.So is the notion of the human [38/39] soul as one entity from birth to death, a subtle some­thing within the body and not identical with the experiences and feelings or with any phenomenal unity of these. . . . These are not the directly intuited categorical features, aspects of God's very being, which are at issue in theology. . . . It is not true that the psychical must be referred to indirectly. Suffering, joy, memory, hope mean their referents directly. And so far as 'soul' is not meant directly, it is, I believe, legend, or poetic embellishment on what is meant directly, namely, the continuity of personal experience—so far as it is contin­uous . . . 'divine person' is not meant metaphorically. It is the hu­man being that more or less exhibits personal continuity and integrity, God that literally is always the same personal 'I.' An animal, which cannot say God, equally cannot say I. There is no derivation of the first notion from the second; but the two are from the outset in [39/40] contrast in experience. The animal feels both itself and God...and thinks neither; we feel and can think both" (DR, 38 ff.). 

". . . metaphysics . . [is] a priori analysis (which does not mean analysis unrelated to experience, but analysis related to the strictly general traits of experience)" (MVG, p. 29). 

". . . proofs must rest on insights . . ." (MVG, p. 59). 

". . . the experiences which are important in philosophy are ob­servations not of particulars but of the dimensions of experience as such, its temporal character, its character as 'purposive,' 'emotional,' more or less 'harmonious,' 'discordant,' and the like. Philosophy is con­cerned with experiences which at least claim to be universal and funda­mental . . ." (MVG, p. 63). 

". . . philosophy . . . [is developed] from the standpoint of the minimal common faith or experience of men in general" (MVG, p. 73). 

"If it be asked how the individual can be aware of this infinite range [of the possible values of the psychological variables], if his experience is finite, the answer is that it is only the distinct or fully conscious aspect of human experience which is finite; while the faint, slightly conscious background embraces all past time (else this phrase has no meaning), all the future, all space, and all possibility. And thanks to this dim consciousness of infinity, we can conceive in principle an indefinite extension of the distinct consciousness which in us is finite. For the theist, the infinite we dimly feel is God, in whom are distinct all the values that are distinct anywhere, and whose experience is the measure of the infinite variables as such, as well as the integration of all the finite values which happen to be any­where actualized" (BH, p. 122). 

"The dimly conscious background of our memory is fully conscious in God; or in other words, this dim consciousness of our total past is the same thing as our dim consciousness of God. If we had not at least a dim awareness of the total past, we could not be said to have even a dim awareness of God's consciousness . . ." (BH, p. 213). 

"[Proofs] presuppose some clarity; and they also presuppose that this clarity represents an imperfect penetration into our dim recognition of the world around—the world of fact, the world of possibility, the world as valued, the world as purposed" (MT, p. 69). 

"For knowledge of special truths, the kind sought in physics, sense data are all-important. For general knowledge the vaguer phenom­ena of emotion, more or less conscious memory, dim anticipation, aesthetic harmony and discord are more relevant. Philosophy has slowly and painfully overcome the opposite or sensationalist emphasis" (BH, p. 267). 

". . . philosophy must found itself upon the presuppositions and the interpretations of ordinary life. In our first approach to philos­ophy, learning should be banished. We should appeal to the simple­minded notions issuing from ordinary civilized social relations" (MT, p. 17). 

"Philosophy is the attempt to make manifest the fundamental evi­dence as to the nature of things . . . .The aim of philosophy is sheer disclosure" (MT, p. 67). 

"My suggestion is that we start from the notion of two aspects of the Universe. It includes a factor of unity, involving in its essence the connexity of things, unity of purpose, and unity of enjoyment. The whole notion of importance is referent to this ultimate unity. There is also equally fundamental in the Universe, a factor of multiplicity. There are many actualities, each with its own experience, enjoying indi­vidually, and yet requiring each other" (MT, p. 70). 

"Our lives are passed in the experience of disclosure. As we lose this sense of disclosure, we are shedding that mode of functioning which is the soul. We are descending to mere conformity with the average of the past. Complete conformity means the loss of life" (MT, p. 87). 

"Where is the evidence?"

"The answer is evidently human experience, as shared by civilized intercommunication. The expression of such evidence, so far as it is widely shared, is to be found in law, in moral and sociological habits, in lit­erature and art as ministering to human satisfactions, in historical judg­ments on the rise and decay of social sys- [96/97] -tems.), and in science. It is also diffused throughout the meanings of words and linguistic expressions.

"Philosophy is a secondary activity. It meditates on this vari­ety of expression" (MT, pp. 96 f.). 

"Our more direct experience groups itself into two large divi­sions, each capable of further analysis. One division is formed by the sense of qualitative experience derived from antecedent fact, enjoyed in the personal unity of present fact, and conditioning future fact. In this division of experience, there are the sense of derivation from with­out, the sense of immediate enjoyment within, and the sense of transmis­sion beyond. This complex sense of enjoyment involves the past, the present, the future. It is at once complex, vague, and imperative. It is the realization of our essential connection with the world without, and also of our own individual existence, now. It carries with it the placing of our immediate experience as a fact in history, derivative, actual, and effective. It also carries with it the sense of immediate experience as the essence of an individual fact with its own qualities. The main characteristic of such experience is complexity, vagueness, and compulsive intensity. In one respect the vagueness yields a comparatively sharp cut division, namely, the differentiation of the world into the animal body which is the region of intimate, intense, mutual expression. and the rest of nature where the intimacy and [98/99] intensity of feel­ing fails to penetrate. . . .

"The second division of human experience has a character very different from the first division of bodily feelings. It lacks the inti­macy, the intensity, and the vagueness. It consists of the discrimina­tion of forms as expressing external natural facts in their relationship to the body. Let this division be termed 'sense-perception.' 

"Now sense-perception belongs to the higher animals. . . . It is a sophisticated-XXX derivative from the more primitive bodily experience which constituted the division of experience first considered. But it has outgrown its origin, and has inverted every emphasis. Its pri-[99/100]mary characteristic is clarity, distinctness, and indifference" (MT, pp. 98 ff.). 

"The animals enjoy structure. . . . Man understands structure [104/105]. . . .To be human requires the study of structure. To be ani­mal merely requires its enjoyment" (MT, pp. 104 f.). 

"We experience more than we can analyze. For we experience the universe, and we analyze in our consciousness a minute selection of its details" (MT, p. 121). 

"What is the dominating insight whereby we presuppose ourselves as actualities within a world of actualities? There can be no argument from a purely subjective experience of qualitative details so as validly to infer a world of actualities coordinate with ourselves. A 'form of reception' will then be simply a mode of make-belief. In other words, a form of reception is re-[146/147]duced to an account of our solipsist existence. It describes our individual experience of a display of qual­itative pattern. It gives an account of an activity within us. It gives no account of ourselves as activities among other activities. It misses the point that we know ourselves as creatures in a world of creatures. We are reduced to an enjoyment of mere appearance. With such assumptions there are no data for the insight into a world of many coordinated actual­ities" (MT, p. 147). 

"At the base of our existence is the sense of 'worth.' Now 'worth' essentially presupposes that which is 'worthy.' Here the notion of worth is not to be construed in a purely eulogistic sense. It is the sense of existence for its own sake, of existence which is its own justification, of existence with its own character. 

"The discrimination of detail is definitely a secondary process, which may or may not assume importance. There is the germ of discrimi­nation, which mayor may not flower into a varied experience. The dimdecision is a large-scale judg-[149/l50]ment—namely, avoidance or maintenance . . . .

"Again the primitive stage of discrimination is not primarily qualitative. It is the vague grasp of reality, dissecting it into a three-fold scheme, namely, The Whole, That Other, and This-Myself. 

"This is primarily a dim division. The sense of totality ob­scures the analysis into self and others. Also this division is primar­ily based on the sense of existence as a value-experience. Namely, the total value-experience is discriminated into this value-experience and those value-experiences. There is the vague sense of many which are one; and of one which includes the many. Also there are two senses of the one—namely, the sense of the one which is all, and the sense of the one among the many. 

"The fundamental basis of this description is that our experience is a value-experience, expressing a vague sense of maintenance or discard; and that this value-experience differentiates itself in the sense of many existences with value-experience; and that this sense of the multiplicity of value-experiences again differentiates it into the totality of value-experience, and the [150/151] many other value-experiences, and the egoistic value-experience. . . . each shares in the existence of the other. The human body provides our closest experience of the interplay of actualities in nature" (MT, pp. 150 f., 157). 

"Analogous notions of activity, and of forms of transition, apply to human experience and to the human body. Thus [157/158] bodily activ­ities and forms of experience can be construed in terms of each other. Also the body is part of nature. Thus we finally construe the world in terms of the type of activities disclosed in our intimate experience" (MT, pp. 157 f.). 

"Our enjoyment of actuality is a realization of worth, good or bad. It is a value-experience. Its basic expression is—Have a care, here is something that matters! Yes—that is the best phrase—the pri­mary glimmering of consciousness reveals, Something that matters. 

"The experience provides attention, dim and, all but, subcon­scious. Attention yields a three-fold character in the 'Something that matters.' Totality, Externality, and Internality are the primary char­acterizations of 'that which matters.' They are not to be conceived as clear, analytic concepts. Experience awakes with these dim presupposi­tions to guide its rising clarity of detailed analysis. They are pre­suppositions in the sense of expressing the sort of obviousness which experience exhibits. There is the totality of actual fact; there is the externality of many facts; there is the internality of experiencing which lies within the totality. 

"These three divisions are on a level. No one in any sense pre­cedes the other. There is the whole fact containing within itself my fact and other facts. Also the dim meaning of fact—or actuality—is intrinsic importance for itself, for the others, and for the whole [159/160] . 

". . . sense-perception for all its practical importance is very superficial in its disclosure of the nature of things" (MT, p. 181). 

"The reason for this blindness of Physical Science lies in the fact that such Science only deals with half the evidence provided by hu­man experience. It divides the seamless coat—or, to change the meta­phor into a happier form, it examines the coat, which is superficial, and neglects the body which is fundamental" (MT, p. 211). 

"Thus our experience in the present discloses its own nature as with two sources of derivation, namely, the body and the antecedent ex­periential functionings. Also there is a claim for identification with each of these sources. The body is mine, and the antecedent experience is mine. Still more, there is only one ego, to claim the body and to claim the stream of experience. I submit that we have here the funda­mental basic persuasion on which we found the whole practice of our ex­istence" (MT, p. 220).

". . . in one sense the world is in the soul.  

"But there is an antithetical doctrine balancing this primary truth. Namely, our experience of the world involves the exhibition of the soul itself as one of the components within the world. . The world is included within the occasion in one sense, and the occasion is included in the world in another sense" (MT, p. 224). 

".  . . those habitual persuasions dominating the sociological functionings of mankind" (MT, p. 227).

". . . philosophy is mystical. For mysticism is direct insight into depths as yet unspoken. But the purpose of philosophy is to ration­alize mysticism: not by explaining it away, but by the introduction of novel verbal characterizations, rationally coordinated. 

"Philosophy is akin to poetry, and both of [237/238] them seek to express that ultimate good sense which we term civilization" (MT, pp. 237 f.).

"That 'all things flow' is the first vague generalization which the unsystemized, barely analyzed intuition of men has produced. . . . Without doubt, if we are to go back to that ultimate, integral exper­ience, unwarped by the sophistications of theory, that experience whose elucidation is the final aim of philosophy, the flux of things is one ultimate generalization around which we must weave our philosophical sys­tem" (PR, p. 317). 

"The best rendering of integral experience [on which phrase, see the passage just above], expressing its general form divested of irrele­vant details, is often to be found in the utterances of religious aspir­ation. One of the reasons of the thinness of so much modern metaphysics is its neglect of this wealth of expression of ultimate feeling" (PR, p. 318; cf. above, p. 2, the passage cited from The Relevance of Whitehead).

"We perceive other things which are in the world of actualities in the same sense as we are. Also our emotions are directed toward other things, including of course our bodily organs. These are our primary be­liefs which philosophers proceed to dissect" (PR, p. 240). 

". . . the metaphysical rule of evidence: that we must bow to those presumptions, which, in despite of criticism, we still employ for the regulation of our lives. Such presumptions are imperative in exper­ience. Rationalism is the search for the coherence of such presumptions" (PR, p. 229). 

". . . the primary realities that we experience—the self and its companion selves" (H. R. Niebuhr, Radical Monotheism, p. 140).

". . . there is something in our human existence, in our world, with our companions and in ourselves that cannot be denied yet cannot be understood with the aid of impersonal categories. All our exper­iencing and experimenting, our thinking and communicating goes on within a complex interaction of irreducible 'I's' and 'you's' . . . . In the midst of seeking true understanding of objects and in our efforts to formulate it accurately we note that truth and untruth are present also as relations between selves . . . in any situation in which objective truth is considered interpersonal truth is also involved" (Ibid., pp. 45 f.).