994. eschew

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What is it to eschew nominalism for realism?
It is to allow that "distinctions of logical type have counterparts in extra-linguistic reality" ("Some Reflections on Metaphysics and Reality": 26).
What the realist thus allows is not simply the objective reality of the universal, but "the objective reality of the distinction between universal and particular... The basic issue is the ontological status of logical polarities, e.g., universal-particular. But then the related contrasts actual-possible, or possible-necessary, or contingent-necessary must be similarly treated. The 'nitty-gritty' of the issue concerns the status of modality. Tho~ho say that only propositions are necessary or contingent are the hard-core (or hopeless) nominalists....
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"One more steF}t: modal distinctions are ultimately coincident with
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temporal ones. The actual is the past, the possible is the future" (CSPM: 61).