1451.Logical Types Apply (II)

"Modal all-inclusiveness" (ANTOT: 38) means lIall actuality in one individual actuality, and all possibility in one individual potentiality or capacity for actuality" (79). But, then, one need not employ the psychological term "know" as Hartshorne does in arguing that the divine nonexistence is impossible. Clearly, if there is any sense in which God can be said to know, God's knowledge as God's knowledge must be 1I0mniscient,Il or "modally-all-inclusive," actually knowing all actual things as actual and
Suppose that we have, or can have, any other kind of grasp of how God loves, or even whether God loves.^? ^{If God loves, clearly, we can have no literal grasp of it. But, surely, the prior question is whether God loves, in some sense other than that involved in using the term "lovell as a symbol for God's concrete relatedness to other things, which is to say, as a symbol for what the purely formal rules definitive of individuality, divine as well as non-divine, serve to make explicit.} ^{~8teliLidlly ~liowilig'all} ^{potential things as potential. But, be this as it may, modal all-inclusiveness suffices to exclude the possibility of God's nonexistence, because all-inclusive possibility could not include the possibility of its own nonexistence, and so, if it could not exist, it would not be all-inclusive after all.} ^'I ^{mere matter must mean the zero case of mind, that is, of sentience, memory, and the rest" (LP: 123). Why need, or could, it mean the} ^~^{zero case of} ^r~ivitY, ^{that is, of inclusiveness, internal relatedness, and} ^{the rest? And why need, or could, it mean "the zero of the presence or mani}
^rill^c....hral. ^vs;,' ^{.) {}} ^{festation of God," provided by IIGod" is meant "universal}

^{of qual ity, and of quantity as well}
^{~le+:,.eR-3fH·p,"} ^all
^-,^{inclusiveness," "internal relatedness," etc.?}

^{21. Hartshorne's conclusion that "mind as such" is "the universal correlate}¹⁶ ^II ^{is scarcely warranted by his claim, however valid, that "any quality, to be known, must become a quality of experience in some form" (LP: 124). The only conclusion he seems entitled to draw is that mind as such is the universal correlate of quality, and of quantity as well, as known. But who would dispute this? On the other hand, who can get out of it what Hartshorne tries to get? The fact, even if it be a fact, that mind as subject is, indeed, the universal correlate of quality, is entirely compatible with mind as object being "a mere species of quality," give or take on the ques ti} ^on-~~'~ ^{epi thet.} ^A* ^{Hartshorne's claim that "an infinity of forms of conceivable feeling might be absent, and yet feeling might be present" (LP: 125) evidently presupposes that "feeling" is a proper analogical concept. But how does, or could, Hartshorne establish this? Of course, if feeling is a proper analogical concept, what he says is correct. But what entitles anyone to suppose that it is true? That an infinity of forms of conceivable internal relatedness might be present seems clear enough. But feeling--unless of course "feeling" is simply a word for such relatedness?}

^{Hartshorne's objections to the retort, that} ^II ^{no criterion could tell us that the atom does feel" (LP: 126 f.) can all be met:} ⁽¹⁾ ^{Granted that only "unlimited mind" could detect the faintest traces of mind, the question is precisely whether either unlimited (superior)} ^.2! ^{radically limited ('inferior) nrind can be asserted. (2) That the most vivid experiences are, indeed, not of "an insentient something," if that means of a mere term, rather than the subject of relations by which as subject it is qualitatively modified and complicated, does not go to show that they have "feeling" as their object, unless the question of the scope of feeling is begged. (3) God could love something without} ¹⁷^{detecting the least traces of feeling, provided the proposition, "To feel is}

^{to be related,.' is not convertible--which, again, is just the question.}

^{24. To Hartshorne's rhetorical question, "at what point does the refusal to}^011'^{generalize concepts 'rashly'}^8* ^{beyond good sense become merely the inability} ^."^{or refusal to generalize-period?" I answer, obviously not the point beyond which no further predictive power is achieved, but the point beyond which nothing is or could be known to be added to what can already be said without the generalizations-either in concepts that are already utterly general or by means of other concepts used symbolically or metaphorically (LP: 128).}

^{If, as Hartshorne holds. "metaphysics is essentially a question of the logical structure of concepts" (LP: 11), then metaphysics cannot be "essentially,1l but only inessential a question of analogy! For, analogy is not itself a question of logical structure, but simply presupposes this question. But with what consistency, then, can Hartshorne say, e.g., that}

^{Hartshorne can sometimes appear to reduce the concept "God" to nothing but an "analogy," or analogical concept (LP: 100 f.), as though there were not, or could not be, a purely formal, strictly literal concept of God explicative of the logical structure implied by the analogical concept. If to say things lIin terms of God, instead of reality, does not change the formal pattern, but it re1 a tes the pattern to experi ence by a certain ana logy,}
^{Re: LP: 100 f.--Hartshorne's argument here is scarcely convincing. To say that "human love is a particular form" is already to beg the question if it is thereby assumed that "the manner in which it figures as base of our analogy is logically non-restrictive, even though in psychological probability (in the way our imagination works) some restrictiveness may be more or less} ^Il ^{ontology [by which he clearly means nothing other than "metaphysics in the classical sense" (LP: 30)] ... is idealistic (in the panpsychic or realistic form) or nothing" (RSP: 84)? Clearly, allowing that idealism in the relevant sense is analogical, one could say this only} ^b~ ^{rejecting Hartshorne's statement that metaphysics is essential a question of logical structure as at best incomplete and misleading, requiring revision so as to read, "metaphysics is essentially two questions: of the logical structure of fundamental concepts and of the development of metaphysical analogies for expressing what these concepts apply to. See Hartshorne's statement that "the basic decisions are not as to metaphors, but as to logical structure. What depends upon what, what includes what, what is necessary to or contingent upon what?" (CSPM: 129).} ^II ^{theV\ either IIGod" is without any meaning with respect to formal pattern, or "reality" is so used that the formal pattern to which it refers already implies what "God" makes explicit.} ¹⁸^N..^{inevitable." As the distinction..;.t;-here tries to make between "conceiving"}^'1 ^{and "imagining," together with the standard concession that "in psychological probability ... some restrictiveness may be more or less inevitable," only too clearly reveals, he is here assuming the traditional distinction between res significata (with respect to which "love" figures in the analogy as "logically non-restrictive") and modus significandi (with respect to which "some} ^II^{restrictiveness may be more or less}

^{does, or could, Hartshorne distinguish what he means by 1l1 ove}

^{less meaningful than IIrelativity to some" and IIrelativity to none.}

^{28. Why the IIspeculative}^inevitabl~. ^{But the question, of course, is how Hartshorne knows, or could know, that this distinction applies to the term "love." Of course, if "love" expresses a proper analogy, what he says is true. But the question is precisely whether "love" does, or can, express such an analogy, and Hartshorne doesn't answer this question but merely begs it-by asserting "flatly" that "human love is a particular form"! Moreover, how} ¹⁹ ^ll ^{in saying that lithe manner in which it figures as the base of our analogy is logically nonrestrictive}^ll ^{from II relativity,1I lIinternal relatedness} ^ll ^{? When "whatever is special or odd about human love,1I or, more generally, about creaturely love is abstracted from, what is left except "relativityll as a transcendental? Thus, for all Hartshorne shows, as distinct from merely asserting, lito say that love must be limited in flexibility" is not IImerely one of the many ways in which the positivistic alternative to theism may be put" (LP: 101). For, however limited the flexibility of love may be, there need be no limit set to the} ^{flexibility of "relativity,1I because, "relativity to all} ^il ^{is and must be no} ^1I^ll ^{in IIspeculative philosophy," which Hartshorne takes} ^{as synonymous with "metaphysics}^ll ^{(lia general speculative philosophy or meta}^physics^ll ^{[LP: xiii]), as well as identifies as his own IIcause" (lithe cause of speculative philosophyll [LP: 10])? Presumably, if philosophy essentially involves generalization, in the sense of refining and extending the "ordinary} ^meanings^ll ^{of terms (as Hartshorne insists it does--in e.g., LP: 219, RSP: 85), there's nothi ng else for it to be except "specul ati ve. " But what if metaphysics is conceived in the way Hartshorne conceives it when he says that it is lIessentially a question of the logical structure of concepts,1I of so analyzing the concepts and propositions of ordinary experience as to explicate their} ^{transcendental implications? Wherein need there be anything IIspeculative}^ll ^{about this? Note how Hartshorne contrasts 'methodological materialism' (bet}
^II^{ter, 'physicalism')" \rlith lithe speculative psychical ism which alone can escape dualism without denial of any given aspects of reality" (CSPM: 54).}²⁰

^{29. "Even analogical affirmations should commit one to something" (LP: 37). But to what? I submit: to the logic or logical structure of the concepts involved in the affirmations, in the sense of the "rules" or "laws" explicative of the meaning of these concepts. Thus, to say that God could have created a world other than any world he does create is to imply that there are unactualized potentialities in God, that God is not actus purus--or conversely. Is,}^...-^{~_{V1"1 o}.v·}^{or coul}^d, ^{Hartshorne be.t-commi tted to} ^any~ ^{than this?} _^.;_^/" _{^{30. Hartshorne reasons that the classification of certain "descriptions" of God, besides "obviously formal" and "obviously material" ideas about God, "depends partly upon one's philosophical beliefs" (LP: l39). How so? If you are a panpsychist, "psychical concepts are categorial, universal in scope," so that "to say God has awareness, feeling, memory, sympathy" is not to make the "material statement" it may seem to be, but, rather, to make an "analogical" statement. On the contrary, if you do not hold panpsychist philosophical be}}_^-Pcur.:s_{^{liefs, to say this is to make a material statement, on all}}_^fol"ffi~ _{^{with "ob}}
_^.;1_{^{viously material II statements, IIfor . some rather than all creatures have these sc. psychical] qualities.}}

_{^{in scope," in the sense that they are "universally applicable to concrete singulars"?}}

_{^{Why is there a Iiset of concepts often applied to God which are distinct both from very specific terms like 'shepherd ' and very abstract terms like 'relative'll? Because "there is a legitimate broadest possible meaning of psychical terms sc. like 'knowledge,}}
_{^{When Hartshorne says that there is a third group of "'problematic' terms, which may be literal if or insofar as we have religious intuition, like 'know' or 'love"' (CSPM: 155), he clearly misleads and is misled. For, by his own account, such terms cannot possibly be "literal" in the same sense in which he has hitherto used the word, whatever their derivation--and yet he fails to}}

_²²

_{^{explain any other sense in which he is using the word. They cannot possibly be literal}}

_{^{'know,' to 'feel,' to 'remember'--here there are qualitative differences which are not easily covered by empty terms like 'way' or 'degree'li (154). God obviously does not know as a man knows, any more than a dog knows as man knows. But, then, to say that IIGod knows" cannot be to make a 1iteral statement, in the sense in which IIGod is relative" is a literal statement. Nor can it be literal even when "relative" is understood to mean "relative in the way or to the degree in which the universal individual alone can be relative," because even then there remain the "qualitative differences" between God's knowing and our own or a dog's.}}_^1I _{^{But why IIdepends partlyll? Because, "even assuming panpsychism, the most general psychical terms, though universally applicable to concrete singulars .. are not purely formal in the same sense as the other categorial terms." But, surely, the sophisticated panpsychist is well aware of this? In reality, then, the classification of analogical "de}}_{^{scri pti ons" of dei ty depends wholly upon one}} _^I _{^{s phil osophi ca 1 bel i efs}} _^! _{^{The obvious question, then, is as to the justification of these beliefs. What warrants panpsychism, not relatively to other equally "speculative,1I or "gnostic," options such as "dualism" and "materialism" ( materialistic monism), but absolutely, i.e., as the claim that II psychical concepts are categorial, universal 21}} _^I _{^{'will,' 'love'] which is applicable to all individuals whatever, from atoms to deity" (CSPM: 154). Thus they are distinct from "very specific terms like 'shepherd,'" on the one hand, which apply only to "quite specific sorts of things, definite items found here and there in existence" (152), and from "very abstract terms like 'relative,'11 on the other, because of the "still wider applicability, or greater abstractness, of the strictly categorial Aotions}} _^[. ^{like 'relative ' or 'finite ' ]," whose meaning "does not vary from one level to another in the scale of beings" (154). But what if one allows as how "relative" has a different sense, which can be specified "quite literally," depending on whether it is understood to apply to individuals, or events, on the one hand, or to groups of individuals and abstractions, on the other? Are terms like IIknowledge,1I IIwill," "1 ove ," when used in their "legitimate broadest possible meaning," distinct from terms like "relative," when used with reference to concrete singulars (as distinct from abstractions and groups)? If they are still distinct, wherein does their distinctiveness lie, and how can one know them to be thus distinctive?} ^{~ because~} ^{while lito be 'constituted in some way by contingent relations' is simply and literally that, no} ^more~ ^{no less, and no other," lito} ^{Consequently~} ^{if there is any sense in which these "prob}{~}

*_^~use._^lematic_^ll*	*_^terms*	*_^can*	*_{^{be said}}*	*_^to*	*_{^{apply literally to}}*	*_^God,*	*_{^{it is the}}*	*_^"strange_^game"***
*_^,If*
*_{^{of which Hartshorne speaks}}*	*_{^{in the parallel}}*	*_^passage*	*_{^{in LP:}}*	*_^141.*	*_^What*	*_^sense*	*_^is*

Page tree

1451.Logical Types Apply (II)