1891.What Is

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What is the datum of which philosophy is the critical analysis? . as the man to the cell, the divine to the man would be a vague environment rather than a definite social other [190/191]. the vagueness which inevitably limits the direct vision'~ ~hich we men could possibly have of God gives us plenty of freedom of interpretation of the divine datum, this freedom going all the way to denying that there is a God. An indistinct datum can always be explained away, if not completely, still sufficiently for a good many purposes" (~WG, 190 f.).

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"As for the idea that as created beings we can know God only as he is not, or as he is in the creatures not as he is in himself, this idea I believe to be crude. It is vagueness, not blank ignorance, that we have to struggle against. The whole idea of religion, at any rate, is precisely that we can know God as he is in himself (though vaguely), for we know him through love, and love is 'taking the standpoint of the other' (Mead). . God as cause is in his effects, and God as cause is God himself. We do not know the creatures at all, if theism is sound, just in themselves, and then by negating their limitations infer God. On the contrary (and this is why human friendship is no substitute for religious love), we know ourselves and everything else in relation toit is said that since we know God not directly but through the creatures, and since he is not a creature but the creator, we must know him through negation essentially. But if God is known wholly indirectly, then he cannot be immanent in experience, and this conflicts with his ubiquity and immensity. Even Aquinas will be found admitting that we are not wholly without direct awareness of God, quite apart from special revelation or mystic states" (MVG, 123). 2 our dim but direct sense of God's love, with which we are one by our

subconscious but inalienable returning love for him. The arguments by which it is held to be shown that God cannot be positively (even though vaguely) known by us simply beg the question, turning as they do on the characteristic categories of first-type theism [127/128], such as the

idea of a being wholly without accidents, hence having no essence distinguishable from accidents, etc." (MVG, 127 f.).

"The philosopher[;E~ Whitehead] himself once told his students ~that (I quote from memory), 'as physics is the interpretation of our external perceptual experiences, so metaphysics is the interpretation of our religious experiences'" (The Relevance of Whitehead, p. 25).

"Just as science has refined upon primitive ideas derived from external particular perceptions, so philosophy has refined upon ideas derived from more internal and pervasive experiences" (PSG, p. 479) •_{". . theological [sc. philosophical-theological] terms, though literal, derive this literal meaning from intuitions which are not conspicuous in normal human experience, and must be carefully distinguished from other, more conspicuous intuitions with which they may be confused. What we need . . is not metaphors to convey the meaning, but the thorough elimination of the metaphorical meanings which are always threatening to substitute themselves; thus the notions of God as judge or as monarch are highly and dangerously metaphorical. So is the notion of the human [38/39] soul as one entity from birth to death, a subtle something within the body and not identical with the experiences and feeling~ or with ~ny phpnompn~l l1nity of th}~_{_ _ Th~ ~r~ not thp rli
rectly intuited categorical features, aspects of God's very being, which 3}

_{are at issue in theology. . It is not true that the psychical must be referred to indirectly. Suffering, joy, memory, hope mean their referents directly. And so far as 'soul' is not meant directly, it is,}

_{I believe, legend, or poetic embellishment on what is meant directly, namely, the continuity of personalexperience--so far as it is continuous. 'divine person' is not meant metaphorically. It is the human being that more or less exhibits personal continuity and integrity, God that literally is always the same personal 'I.' An animal, which cannot say God, equally cannot say I. There is no derivation of the first notion from the second; but the two are from the outset in [39/40] contrast in experience. The animal feels both itself and God . . and thinks neither; we feel and can think both" (DR, 38 ff.).}| _{"· metaphysics . [is] a priori analysis (which does not mean} | _{analysis unrelated} | _to | _experience, | _{but analysis related} | _to | _the | _strictly |