By Schubert Ogden
The Notebooks of Schubert Ogden
1. Whether or not Y's believing p simply because X enunciates p is reasonable depends on whether or not X's de facto epistemic authority for Y is also legitimate or valid, i.e., de jure, authority. And this depends, in turn, on X's de facto epistemic authority also being a grounded epistemic authority.
2. X's de facto epistemic authority for Y is a grounded epistemic authority if, and only if, it is possible for someone -- if not Y, then others -- to test X's claims to knowledge in realm R. This means (1) that knowledge of what X claims to know can be attained otherwise than by relying on some epistemic authority; and (2) that there is an independent criterion by which all claims to knowledge in R can be tested.
July 1996
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